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This study investigates the relationship between founding-family governance, international 
activities and corporate performance in the Swedish institutional setting. Previous research has 
mainly studied founder-controlled firms, i.e. firms where founders or their descendants hold 
top management positions, in the context of corporate performance and ownership composition. 
In particular, this paper anchors in the theoretical bodies of finance and international business 
and hypothesizes a negative effect of founding family governance on internationalization 
decisions. Nevertheless, these firms are anticipated to outperform other entities when they 
engage in international activities. Unlike other studies, this paper investigates whether the 
founder’s control of voting rights impacts the decision to geographically diversify. 
Furthermore, this paper examines whether there is a distinction in financial performance of 
founding family firms where the founders employ top management positions (CEO or 
Chairman of the board) versus serving as board members only. The initial sample consists of 
5,228 firm-year observations from listed entities on the Nasdaq OMX Stockholm Exchange 
between 2001 and 2019. Following prior research, the sample is further narrowed to 3,048 
unique firm-year observations which forms the basis for the empirical analyses. The results 
from the statistical regressions find abutment in all the proposed research hypotheses. 
Specifically, this paper finds strong support that founder-controlled firms indeed are present in 
fewer geographical locations and as such are less internationalized compared to firms having 
dissimilar governance structures. These results are further enhanced when increasing the 
founders share of voting rights. Nevertheless, although founder-controlled firms seem to follow 
the incremental internationalization process as described by the Uppsala Model, they seem to 
outperform other entities when they undertake internationalization decisions. The overall 
findings further imply that firms where the original founder persists substantial control create 
superior value, have efficient strategies and are more profitable which in turn indicates that such 
entities might be a favorable investment opportunity for outside stakeholders.  
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1 INTRODUCTION  
Firms in today’s global economy are exposed by an external pressure to internationalize their 
business to remain competitive. Factors such as enhanced use of new technology, marketing, 
efficient supply chain management, market liberalization, and R&D activities form the basis of 
an extensive set of resources and capabilities that provide opportunities for international 
expansion of business activities (Naldi & Nordqvist, 2008). The phenomenon of globalization 
poses a compelling question: does the benefits of geographical diversification outweigh the 
costs? The answer is bilateral, however the tendency among researchers seems to be that the 
relationship between internationalization and corporate performance are closely associated 
(Qian, Li, Li, & Qian, 2008).  
Many studies in recent years have examined corporate ownership structures and the 
consequences on firm performance. Research performed by La Porta et al (1999) showed that 
several firms have a concentrated ownership structure, meaning that they have a controlling 
shareholder interest which is usually a family or the State. The results further demonstrated that 
such owners most commonly were referred to as the original founders of the firm. These 
enterprises are described as “founder-controlled firms” and are typically characterized by 
decision-makers having extraordinary strong personal motives in relation to international 
expansions (Faccio & Lang, 2002). Regardless of ownership composition, it is commonly 
accepted that non-domestic activities and internationalization strategies affect corporate 
performance (Yang & Driffield, 2012).  
This study sheds light on the disparities between founder-controlled firms and entities 
having other ownership compositions and whether corporate governance structure influences 
the decision to internationalize. Specifically, I look at internationalization of public founding 
family firms in the Swedish institutional context. Literature from the international business field 
suggests that a firm’s resources and capabilities will be decisive for the success of geographical 
diversification strategies (e.g., Naldi & Nordqvist, 2008; Strange et al., 2009). Especially, 
founder-controlled firms seem to encounter resource challenges when entering foreign markets. 
They normally appreciate other qualities such as organic long-term growth strategies and 
personal commitment that may enhance the international expansion process of their business 
activities, although at a slower pace compared to other firms (Naldi & Nordqvist, 2008). 
Nevertheless, lack of resources such as financial strength, limited knowledge and experience 
from foreign markets, and restricted management capabilities might prevent founder-controlled 
firms from seizing internationalization opportunities (ibid).    
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The pace of corporate decisions, including strategies on geographical diversification, 
will typically be divergent for founder-controlled firms compared to other entities. Ordinarily, 
the founders will have exceptional knowledge of the business and will further be reluctant to 
give up control of the organization. The original founders often lack diversification, meaning 
that they are heavily invested in a limited number of assets. As a result, founder-controlled 
firms are subject to a high firm-specific risk (Demsetz & Lehn, 1985; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). 
The founders are normally close-to-business which is demonstrated by excellent overview and 
control over most of the decision-making. Thus, agency problems between owners and 
management are generally not present (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). However, these are replaced 
by agency conflicts between majority and minority shareholder due to information asymmetry 
(Shleifer & Vishny, 1986).  
The empirical analyses consist of multiple regressions performed on a unique 
unbalanced sample of listed Swedish corporations. Sample data are manually collected from 
approximately 3,000 annual reports and contain information on foreign sales and employees, 
geographical locations and ownership compositions of the entities. Swedish firms are further 
known for transparency in financial disclosures and high quality in the accounting information 
(La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 1999; Leuz, Nanda, & Wysocki, 2003). This study 
extends the work performed by Mattias Hamberg and Alice Schmuck in a preliminary draft 
paper. They investigated publicly listed Swedish firms and whether there is a relationship 
between founder-controlled firms, international activities and performance for the time period 
between 2001 to 2013. Their results are already significant and show that Swedish founding 
family firms are less internationalized and expel cautious behavior when conducting 
geographical diversification. Additionally, their results further suggest that performance and 
internationalization decisions are closely associated for founder-controlled firms (Schmuck & 
Hamberg, 2019). This paper expands their work by examining the time period from 2001 to 
2019 and 1) whether entities with dissimilar governance structures have different degree of 
internationalization, and 2) whether corporate performance is correlated to different approaches 
of internationalization strategies of founder-controlled firms compared to other enterprises. 
Additionally, this thesis will present different interpretations of founding family firms and 
challenge their impact on internationalization decisions and corporate performance.  
This paper suggests an incremental internationalization process for founding family 
firms as described by the Uppsala Model (Johanson & Vahlne, 1977). The purpose of the model 
is to maintain control of the firm while entering foreign markets step-by-step and to gradually 
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obtain knowledge from international operations rather than pursuing an intensifying 
geographical diversification of business activities. Considering this approach, firms may utilize 
knowledge-sharing across geographical expansions into new foreign locations.  
Subsequently, the paper investigates the association between performance and 
international activities for founder-controlled firms. The extent of geographical diversification 
will be measured by three different dimensions; the amount of non-domestic sales, the number 
of foreign employees, and the presence in foreign locations. Previous research has shown that 
firms with a concentrated ownership, i.e. founding family firms, have a greater Tobin’s Q (TQ) 
value and higher performance compared to other firms (Hamberg, Fagerland, & Nilsen, 2013). 
In this study, I find that the extent of international activities does not necessarily correlate with 
better performance in general. The results emphasize that founding family governance firms 
perform better than the average family firm. Furthermore, the findings suggest that founder-
controlled firms benefit from an internationalization process in line with the Uppsala Model; 
an incremental and cautious expansion step-by step while maintaining control of the business.     
Opposed to the assumption that family governance is detrimental, this paper finds 
enhanced corporate performance in founding family firms where the original founders hold top 
management positions (CEO or Chairman) compared to other firms. In particular, the results 
strongly suggest that such firms outperform other founding family firms where the founders 
only serve as board members. Furthermore, this paper also finds a clear tendency that increased 
ownership concentration, measured as an increase in voting rights by the founding family, 
resulted in a lower degree of internationalization.  
This single-country research contributes to the growing founding family firm literature 
in at least three ways. First, the Uppsala Model is used to provide further insight on the 
characteristics of founder-controlled family firms that are associated to international activities 
in contrast to other firms. Based on the results of this study, founding family entities in the 
Swedish context seem to perform better when taking on a cautious behavior in the 
internationalization process. These firms are, in general, present in fewer geographical regions 
compared to other owners. Unlike other studies, this paper investigates how increased 
ownership concentration in terms voting rights, affects foreign diversification decisions. The 
findings indicate that increased ownership concentration of the founding family is correlated to 
a lower degree of internationalization. Second, this study adds to the theoretical grounds of 
international business by investigating disparities between the internationalization of founding 
family firms versus other organizations and whether the type of ownership affects corporate 
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performance. Research is still scarce on the association between different owner types, 
international expansion strategies and profitability (Fernández & Nieto, 2006; Graves & 
Thomas, 2006; Johanson & Vahlne, 2009). Lastly, this thesis extends former research findings 
by establishing disparities in performance between founding family governance where founders 
employ top management positions compared to other family firms where founders serve as 
board members in a unique Swedish institutional setting.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follow. In the second chapter, the theoretical 
foundations resulting in three research hypotheses will be presented. Specifically, the Uppsala 
process model of internationalization will be utilized to better understand the geographic 
diversification strategy and characteristics of founder-controlled firms in contrast to other 
owners. The third chapter presents the overall research strategy and the methodological choices 
for this study, including the regression models. Furthermore, this section will describe the 
manual data collection process and the unique unbalanced sample consisting of publicly listed 
firms in Sweden during the fiscal years 2001 to 2019. The following section includes the 
empirical analyses of the data presented in section three and investigates the relationship 
between ownership types, internationalization and corporate performance. Section five 
concludes the paper and provides suggestions for further research.  
 
1.2 Purpose  
The aim of this paper is to examine the relationship between founder-controlled firms, 
internationalization and performance and whether different interpretations of “founder” imply 
divergent impact on internationalization decisions of the firm. Establishing and investigating 
the association between corporate governance, international expansion and financial 
performance should be of interest for both corporate stakeholders (and potential investors) as 
well as academics within the field. The study is performed for Swedish listed entities and as 
such it adds to a growing body of founding family literature by considering different regulatory 





2 THEORY AND RESEARCH HYPOTHESES  
This chapter will substantiate the underlying theory for my research hypotheses. First, founder-
controlled firms and corporate governance in previous literature will be presented. This section 
will focus on dissimilarities between founder-controlled firms and entities having other owners. 
Subsequently, I will explain different internationalization strategies before intertwining the 
Uppsala Model of internationalization with the approach of founder-controlled firms. Lastly, 
the coherence between internationalization, founder-controlled firms and performance is 
described. Building on the theoretical foundations presented, three research hypotheses are 
formulated at the end of this chapter.   
 
2.1 Founder-controlled firms and corporate governance in previous literature  
There is a significant theoretical body of recent literature on the relationship between 
corporate governance and firm performance. Features of the ownership structure, i.e. who is 
defined as the controlling shareholder, influences a firm’s managerial behavior and strategic 
decision-making (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 1999). In a broad sense, governance 
theory concerns how firms are effectively and efficiently managed to ensure that they are 
operated in the interest of the controlling shareholder and generates sufficient returns (Strange, 
Filatotchev, Buck, & Wright, 2009). International business and strategies of multinational 
enterprises have been widely studied in the past and can enrich the research on corporate 
governance and vice versa (ibid). For example, previous studies have focused on firms in a 
specific context neglecting the fuller picture of internationalization. Extending these arguments, 
the underlying governance of a company can be directly associated to both the strategic 
decisions and corresponding outcome of international business expansion (Qian, Li, Li, & Qian, 
2008).     
Founder-controlled firms, i.e. firms where the controlling shareholder is the original 
founder (and often a family), will typically have different characteristics compared to other 
firms. In short, these disparities are intertwined and relate to agency problems and incentive 
alignment (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 1999). Jensen & Meckling (1976, p. 5) 
define an agency relationship as “a contract under which one or more persons (the 
principals(s)) engage another person (the agent) to perform some service on their behalf which 
involves delegating some decision making authority to the agent. If both parties to the 
relationship are utility maximizers, there is a good reason to believe that the agent will not 
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always act in the best interest of the principal”. Following the definition, agency problems 
describe the classical asymmetric information distribution between managers and shareholders. 
Managers working with the firm’s day-to-day business have superior information compared to 
the owners. The dissimilarity in incentive alignment relates to how the founder defines the 
company’s key business and interrelated objectives (Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Shleifer & 
Vishny, 1997). The principal can limit divergencies by giving the agent appropriate incentives 
which also includes a cost of monitoring to restrain the agent’s aberrant actions (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976). Typically, founding family owners will rather keep the business running and 
are more cautious in their strategic business decisions compared to other firms. Hence, the goal 
of founder-controlled firms is not necessarily value-maximization as any rational investor 
would expect in an efficient market. However, the ability of founder-controlled firms to reduce 
information asymmetry and thus align interests between management and controlling 
shareholders outweighs the prospective negative effect of goal incongruence (Anderson & 
Reeb, 2003).  
 The negative consequences of goal incongruence are at least bilateral. At one side, 
founding family owners are often heavily invested into a finite number of assets which 
minimizes the potential benefits of diversification. Thus, the firm-specific risk increases 
parallelly to a decreasing number of investments (Demsetz & Lehn, 1985; Shleifer & Vishny, 
1997). As a result of the inflated firm-specific risk, the founders may exhibit sub-optimal 
decisions leading to low levels of operating and financial risk (Schmid, 2013; Shleifer & 
Vishny, 1986). On the other hand, founding family owners are typically risk-averse and might 
be more reluctant to give up control. Hence, they are more cautions in making aggressive 
business decisions for short-term gains. As such, the family owner would rather focus on 
sustainable long-term investments and survival of the business rather than selling the company 
at an attractive offer due to the emotional attachment and pride to what they once established. 
Moreover, a family owner may for instance be reluctant to outsource production if it means 
giving up local workplaces. Hence, the interests of founding family owners seem more 
interpersonal rather than a sole focus on financial performance. The latter scenario applies to 
Private Equity owners that hold the firm for a defined time-period which tends to be associated 
with financial intermediaries (Rogers, Holland, & Haas, 2007). All the presented motives for 
goal incongruences above are surely associated but could potentially have adverse effects on 
decisions on geographical expansion of the business.   
12 
 
 Positive effects of reduced information asymmetry between owners and management 
also contain various aspects and the elements are somewhat intertwined. First, the emotional 
connection of founding family owners as described above arises from a closeness-to-the-
business since its original inception. The founders are likely to have close ties to both the firm 
and the personnel as the founders, either directly or indirectly, hired the staff in person 
establishing a special bond and a corresponding loyalty.  These effects are illustrated by a long-
lasting imprinting effect (Baron & Hannan, 2002; Beckman & Burton, 2008; Burton, 2001). 
These effects are for instance reflected in long-term commitment and lower turnover among 
founding family firms compared to other firms (Gallo & Sveen, 1991). Second, family founders 
have superior knowledge of the business and perform appropriate monitoring. Thus, 
management may find it hard to make corporate decisions which are not aligned with the 
owner’s interests (Anderson & Reeb, 2003).  
 General contracting theory as presented above together with theory on efficient markets 
are fundamental when studying publicly listed entities. Numerous individuals and corporations 
voluntarily entrust their financial arsenal to managers based on sophisticated contracting 
relationships that delineate the rights and obligations of the involved parties (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976). An efficient market can be characterized as fully reflecting all available 
information on prices. The general idea is to reduce agency- and moral hazard problems 
between stakeholders and managers of publicly traded firms (Fama, 1970). Several instances, 
such as the Dot-com bubble (1995-01), have resulted in overly bullish markets indicating that 
the market is not always entirely efficient. However, the accounting information for publicly 
listed firms in Sweden are available through the annual reports of each firm which is a closer 
proxy to an efficient market compared to private companies. However, in practice, obtaining 
all available information involves e.g. transaction costs and different interpretations of market 
information that need to be accounted for in the efficient market hypothesis for publicly listed 
firms (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
To summarize, family owners are normally risk-averse and hence reluctant to give up 
control of the business. They tend to avoid unnecessary risk-taking for short-term gains and 
value the long-term sustainable survival rather than selling the firm to an attractive offer. The 
behavior of family owners can therefore be characterized by caution in the strategic decision-
making concerning geographical expansion and international activities. The objective of a 
founding firm will typically favor long-term strategies and maintain low turnover rates rather 
than pointless business expansions, potentially at the cost of employees.  
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2.2 Internationalization strategies 
Today’s global market makes it increasingly difficult for entities to outperform other 
firms and reach economies of scale. This may be caused by several aspects, such as enhanced 
and increased use of technology, lower threshold for acquiring knowledge about foreign 
markets and efficient supply chain management. Hence, firms face an external pressure to 
internationalize their business in order to remain competitive (Naldi & Nordqvist, 2008).  
 Internationalization can be defined as “a firm’s propensity to expand its cross-border 
activities in terms of the intensity (for example, level of export) and the scope (for example, 
number of countries to which the firm exports) of such activities” (De Clercq, Sapienza, & 
Crijns, 2005, s. 409). Founding family firms encounter the choice of globalization strategies in 
the international diversification process which is closely associated to the degree of foreign 
commitment (Claver & Quer, 2007). Research has already suggested that market entry 
strategies are beneficial for founding family firms in their internationalization process (ibid.). 
The scope of internationalization strategies is endogenous as it is influenced and limited by a 
firm’s assets and resource endowment. An increased presence and expansion to new global 
regions is associated with a complexity of managing non-domestic commitment such as foreign 
government officials, local law and requirements, suppliers, customers and agencies (Sui & 
Baum, 2014). Thus, the international expansion involves increased investments and firm-
specific risks not necessarily favored by founding family firms. The following section will 
discuss founder-controlled firms in association with the Uppsala Model of internationalization 
in terms of market entry which is an alternative path of global diversification closer to the 
founding family firms’ objectives.   
 
2.3 Founder-controlled firms and the Uppsala Model of internationalization 
A successful internationalization process requires, among others, significant 
investments in facilities or acquisitions of subsidiaries across borders. Founding family firms 
might exert several distinct characteristics that distinguish them from other firms. In this 
section, it is argued that they are exposed to substantial firm-specific risk due to lack of 
diversification of their assets. Furthermore, founding family owners are often reluctant to give 
up control of the firm they once established. Thus, the choice of internationalization strategy 
will typically exhibit signs of caution and risk-averseness compared to other owners.    
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 The original Uppsala Model composed by Johanson & Vahlne (1977) concerns the 
internationalization of family firms and is often cited as the traditional theory within this 
literature (Bobillo, Rodríguez-Sanz, & Tejerina-Gaite, 2013). The model suggests an 
incremental process of internationalization, meaning that the firm takes on a cautious 
perspective by learning and acquiring deeper understanding step-by-step prior to an 
intensification of foreign commitment. By this strategy, the firm-specific risk will be 
substantially reduced as the owners avoid both unnecessary risk-taking and extraordinary short-
term investments into unknown markets (Johanson & Vahlne, 1977).  
 The incremental internationalization process of founding family governance as 
described by the Uppsala Model finds support in previous literature (Claver & Quer, 2007). 
The ability to expand geographically has become increasingly important in today’s global 
economy. However, evidence suggest that founding family firms often tend to ignore the 
importance of gaining knowledge about foreign activities and prospective business 
relationships (Pukall & Calabrò, 2014). These results are supported by Naldi & Nordqvist 
(2008, p. 5) and further defined as the main constraints for geographic diversification for 
founding family firms as “…the family’s tendency to avoid risk taking (Fernández & Nieto, 
2006), the conservatism and resistance to change among family leaders (Gallo & Sveen, 1991; 
Ward, 1987) and the lack of formal control and planning systems (Graves & Thomas, 2006)”.  
 Founding family firms often have more loyal employees and appreciate sustainable 
long-term growth strategies compared to other firms which in turn is expected to positively 
affect the ability of geographical diversification (Claver, Rienda, & Quer, 2008; Gallo & Sveen, 
1991). Contrary, this also suggests that internationalization processes conducted by founder-
controlled firms will be characterized by a circumspect behavior that in turn decelerates the 
diversification progress. Nevertheless, even though founding family governance tend to favor 
internal financing, this might actually benefit the company due to the organic and sustainable 
nature of the internationalization strategy. Founder-controlled firms also have a more 
concentrated ownership which results in increased firm-specific risk. In essence, they will 
indeed have a slower pace of internationalization and make less direct foreign investments, i.e. 
acquisitions, compared to firms having diversified owners. Results have shown that founder-
controlled firms aim at generating surplus from limited geographical regions rather than 
extensive diversification across borders (Zahra, 2003). These arguments support the fact that 
founding family firms follow the incremental internationalization process as the described by 
the Uppsala Model.  
15 
 
To summarize, founding family firms exert cautious and risk-averse behavior in business 
decisions. They tend to appreciate interpersonal aspects rather than short-term economic gains 
and are reluctant to give up control of the firm. Moreover, founding family owners often have 
close ties and emotional affect to the business and hence value sustainable long-term growth.  
Following these characteristics, it can be assumed that they are per se less internationalized 
compared to other firms. In the extension of this hypothesized negative effect, this paper will 
also examine whether the same association is maintained when the voting rights of the founding 
family gradually increases. Building on these arguments, the first research hypotheses of this 
paper is formulated as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 1a: Founding family governance has a negative effect on 
internationalization. 
Hypothesis 1b: Founding family governance has a negative impact on geographic 
diversification.   
 
Hypothesis one is tested both in respect of the extent (in terms of foreign sales and 
employees) and latitude (number of geographical regions) of internationalization. Principally, 
one would associate internationalization with increased revenue streams due to foreign 
commitments (Capar & Kotabe, 2003; Kotabe, Srinivasan, & Aulakh, 2002; Tallman & Li, 
1996). However, as mentioned before, founder-controlled firms are reluctant to make business 
decisions that may lead to unnecessary risks. This will impact the extent of sales across borders 
and the willingness to invest as strategic diversification to foreign markets is a costly and 
uncertain process. Researchers have previously suggested that the firm-specific risk will be 
reduced parallelly to the increase in number of geographical locations, i.e. expansion to non-
domestic markets (Contractor, Kumar, & Kundu, 2007; Capar & Kotabe, 2003; Qian, Li, Li, & 
Qian, 2008). Furthermore, given the cautious behavior of founder-controlled firms, they are 
expected to be less engaged in diversification and acquisitions of foreign subsidiaries. 
Typically, they would focus on sustainable long-term survival rather than undertaking the major 
financial risks associated to foreign direct investments. Following the reasoning above, the lack 
of diversification implies that founder-controlled firms indeed have a greater firm-specific risk 
compared to other firms as the literature also suggest. They might diversify geographically; 
however, at a significantly slower pace due to uncertain nature of unknown markets. This is in 
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line with the results of other researchers which found that founding family governance and the 
presence in geographical regions are negatively correlated (Sanchez-Bueno & Usero, 2014). As 
such, founder-controlled firms are expected to have fewer international activities compared to 
other owners. 
  
2.4 Founder-controlled firms, internationalization and performance 
This part of the paper presents the theoretical body regarding the relationship between 
ownership type, international activities and performance both anchoring in international 
business and finance literature. Researchers within the international business segment have 
already found results showing that the degree of international activities have a positive 
association to corporate performance (Kotabe, Srinivasan, & Aulakh, 2002; Tallman & Li, 
1996). As already explained in previous sections, the internationalization process will be 
different for founder-controlled firms in contrast to other firms. By geographical diversification 
of business activities, enterprises may utilize resources such as R&D activities, marketing, new 
technology and financial assets to obtain economies of scale (Yang & Driffield, 2012). 
However, it has become increasingly difficult to stand out to in a competitive market.  
Increased foreign commitment may benefit firms in several ways. On one hand, the 
organization may profit from sharing knowledge and previous experience across borders. On 
the other hand, the firm may avoid pitfalls and rely on critical success factors from prior 
experience in other geographical business locations (Capar & Kotabe, 2003). Researchers agree 
that the same reasoning is applicable to family firms. However, the available literature on this 
area is scarce (Kontinen & Ojala, 2010).  
 From a finance literature perspective, the results from previous studies strongly suggest 
that the association between corporate governance and performance is highly correlated 
(Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Isakov & Weisskopf, 2014; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). Furthermore, 
it is widely acknowledged by several researchers that founding family firms have enhanced 
corporate performance compared to other enterprises (Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Barontini & 
Caprio, 2006; Hamberg, Fagerland, & Nilsen, 2013; Isakov & Weisskopf, 2014; Villalonga & 
Amit, 2006).  
 Founder-controlled firms exert a cautious behavior in decision-making. Hence, they are 
expected to conduct more efficient investments compared to firms with other owners (James, 
1999). As such, agency problems between shareholders and managers seem rather 
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unproblematic as the firm and its owners have their incentives aligned due to e.g. long-term 
commitment, motivation, incentive structures and the presence of founders being close-to-
business (Demsetz & Lehn, 1985). Anderson and Reeb (2003, p. 1305) further claim that: 
“…the family’s wealth is so closely linked to firm welfare, families may have strong incentives 
to monitor managers and minimize the free-riding problem inherent with diffused shareholders. 
If monitoring requires knowledge and information about firm technology and processes, 
families potentially provide superior oversight because of their lengthy involvement with the 
firm”. Thus, by aligning incentives ultimately decreases the cost of monitoring and further 
benefits the firm in the value maximization of the business in terms of profitability.  
 Combining the finance and the international business literature, the amount of foreign 
sales and the degree of international commitment will benefit from a founding family ownership 
structure. Following this reasoning, the second research hypothesis of this paper is derived as 
follows:   
 
Hypothesis 2: Founding family governance have a positive effect on the 
relationship between geographical expansion and performance.  
 
Lastly, building on the same reasoning and theory presented above, this paper will 
investigate the performance of founder-controlled family firms when the founders hold top 
management positions such as Chief Executive Officer (CEO) or Chairman of the Board. 
Contrary to the assumption that family governance is detrimental, several researchers find 
significant positive associations between this governance structure and profitability (see e.g. 
Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Hamberg, Fagerland & Nilsen, 2013). Anderson & Reeb (2003) 
studied large public U.S founding family firms present on the S&P 500 and the correlation to 
firm performance. In particular, they found strong results indicating that family members 
(founders or their descendants) holding top management positions exhibit a positive association 
to corporate performance measures compared to other firms. These results were consistent 
irrespective of accounting for other blockholders or the discrepancy between control rights and 
family governance. This study investigates the relationship and difference between firm 
performance when the founding family employs top management positions versus serving as a 
board member only in a large single-country study in the Swedish institutional setting. Hence, 
the third and final research hypothesis of this paper is:  
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Hypothesis 3: Founding family firms having original founders or descendants 
in top management positions (CEO or Chairman) will outperform other 
entities.     
 
To summarize, this chapter has provided a theoretical foundation of previous literature within 
international business, finance and the founding family firm field. Based on the presented 
theory, this paper has derived three research hypotheses as formulated above. The following 
section will describe methodological choices and operationalizations of the variables subject to 



















3 RESEARCH METHOD AND DESIGN 
This chapter aims at introducing the methods applied to address and test the hypotheses 
formulated in section two. First, the methodological considerations will be substantiated. 
Subsequently, the sample and data collection process will be described followed by a section 
on quality and validity and an operationalization of the different variables utilized in this paper. 
The last section will discuss the models and potential collinearity in the statistical regressions 
performed.  
 
3.1 Research strategy  
Bryman and Bell (2015, chapter 2 and 3) argue for two methodological considerations 
that must be addressed prior to empirical research; 1) the choice of research strategy, i.e. 
whether the underlying data should be investigated using a numerical or text-based approach, 
and 2) research design and method. The latter refers to the frameworks used to properly collect 
and analyze data to answer the overall research hypotheses as presented in chapter two. Scholars 
distinguish between qualitative and quantitative research strategies where the principal 
difference lies in the treatment of theory and research. A qualitative method is an inductive 
approach, meaning that its primary goal is to create hypotheses or theories based on the data 
collection. The quantitative approach is deductive, i.e. testing of pre-defined hypotheses prior 
to statistical simulation (Bryman & Bell, 2015, p. 23). 
This paper employs a quantitative longitudinal approach to examine the relationship 
between founder-controlled firms, international activities and performance. The data sample is 
fairly large and as such a quantitative research design is considered most appropriate to 
investigate dependent and independent variables through statistical simulations using 
regression and correlation analyses. Regressions will be run using both univariate and 
multivariate approaches. The former means that only one variable is included in the regression, 
while the latter explains several variables simultaneously (Bryman & Bell, 2015, chapter 15). 
Further, this paper adopts a deductive approach to test the research hypotheses which is 
considered natural given the choice of research strategy. The following section will further 





3.2 Research design and method  
Following Bryman & Bell (2015, chapter 3), a research design is simply a guiding 
framework for the data collection and empirical analyses in order to conclude with specific 
results. This paper uses a longitudinal approach as the sample consists of repeated observations 
over the time period 2001 to 2019 including the same variables every year (extent of foreign 
sales, number of foreign employees, presence in different geographical regions and corporate 
performance).  
 The research method is commonly referred to as the technique used in data collection 
(Bryman & Bell, 2015). Swedish firms are transparent in financial disclosures (Leuz, Nanda, 
& Wysocki, 2003), and hence all the information for this study is publicly available through 
either the annual report of each firm or in financial databases such as Thomson Reuters Eikon 
database. The sample collection procedure will be explained in more details in the following 
section.  
 
3.3 Sample collection procedure  
The sample used in this study consists of listed entities on the Nasdaq OMX Stockholm 
Exchange between 2001 to 2019. The benefit of using 19 years of data material will minimize 
the risk of biases such as cyclical effects of peaks and recessions. In turn, a long time period 
will provide a more realistic and fair view of the development over the time period under 
investigation. A large sample of data may also enable any generalization of the results.    
 
3.3.1 The Swedish institutional setting  
Swedish firms, and specifically founder-controlled firms, have been subject to several 
studies in the past. As an example, a study performed by Hamberg et al. (2013) found that 
founder-controlled firms domiciled in Sweden outperformed firms having other ownership 
compositions during the same time period. These findings are consistent with results from other 
studies on founder-controlled firms in the United States and Switzerland (Anderson & Reeb, 
2003; Isakov & Weisskopf, 2014).  
 Further, geographical diversification and export of goods and services of Swedish firms’ 
business is central to the strategic decision-making. The Swedish economy has seen a major 
increase in exports during the last couple of decades. As an example, Swedish exports in 2019 
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amounted to approximately 47.02%1 of GDP, compared to only 11.73%2 in the United States. 
Previous studies on the relationship between firm performance and internationalization show 
that small European companies, in this case firms domiciled in Sweden, will have many small 
subsidiaries that are highly geographically diversified (Glaum & Oesterle, 2007).  
 Accounting information for Swedish listed entities is publicly accessible due to 
extensive nature and transparency of the financial information provided to stakeholders. 
Further, the accounting information in the financial reports are of high quality (Leuz, Nanda, & 
Wysocki, 2003). Findings by La Porta et al. (1999) supports the transparency in the Swedish 
market and their results demonstrate that Swedish firms disclose annual reports containing more 
detailed financial reporting compared to firms domiciled in other countries. As such, it enables 
the collection of necessary accounting information on international activities of the Group and 
its subsidiaries located in foreign markets. The latter follows a mandate to disclose segment 
reporting and business activities across geographical locations according to the requirements of 
IFRS 83. Lastly, the benefit of transparency in the annual financial statements renders the 
gathering of information on shareholders at an individual level. Thus, it is feasible to identify 
and separate founder-controlled firms from entities having different corporate governance.   
 
3.3.2 Sample and data collection  
As previously mentioned, the data sample for the empirical analyses consists of listed 
entities on the Nasdaq OMX Stockholm Exchange between the years 2001 to 2019. This is a 
large, unbalanced data set, i.e. it eliminates prospective risk of survival bias. The total sample 
consists of 606 unique publicly listed Swedish firms including a total of 5,228 firm-year 
observations manually collected from each firm’s annual report. Additionally, accounting 
information on financial performance is downloaded from the Thomson Reuters Eikon database 
and information on voting rights and ownership concentration are manually collected from SIS 
Ägarservice.     
As presented in Appendix I, table 1, the initial data set consisted of 5,228 observations 
(606 unique listed firms) from different industries before any adjustments. However, aligning 
the study with previous research, investment companies, real-estate firms and financial 
 
1 Source: https://www.theglobaleconomy.com/Sweden/exports/ (visited 27.05.21)  
2 Source: https://www.theglobaleconomy.com/USA/exports/ (visited 27.05.21) 
3 Listed entities are mandated to follow IFRS 8 on segment reporting in order to disclose information on foreign 
business activities to current and potential investors. 
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institutions are removed from the sample (885 firm-years) due to different regulatory 
requirements and business environment compared to the remaining sample. I will also exclude 
firms lacking publicly available accounting information (253 firm-years) and firms missing 
annual reports for a specific year (13 firm-years). As this paper investigates the degree of 
internationalization of founding family firms in Sweden, entities having only non-Swedish 
business operations (139 firm-years) and firms not domiciled in Sweden (344 firm-years) will 
also be precluded. Lastly, firms with a defined home marked outside Sweden (317 firm-years) 
and firms having only Swedish operations (229 firm-years) are also excluded from the total 
samples. These adjustments and exclusions resulted in a final unbalanced sample of 3,048 firm-
year observations (341 unique firms) as evident in Appendix I (table 1).  
 
3.3.3 Data collection procedure  
 The final unbalanced panel of 341 unique publicly listed Swedish entities constitutes 
3,048 firm-year observations between the years 2001-2019. Data between 2001 and 2013 was 
manually collected by Mattias Hamberg and Alice Schmuck. The accounting information for 
the years between 2014-2019 was obtained from public databases and manually from the notes 
to the financial statements from each firm’s annual reports. This included reading almost 1,500 
annual reports and manually collect and asses detailed accounting information which forms the 
basis for the empirical analyses. Specifically, the manual data collection centers around three 
elements: 1) the total number of employees, both international and domestic, 2) the extent of 
total sales, both global and domestic, and 3) the presence in geographical markets (in terms of 
employees or subsidiaries).       
 
3.4 Quality and validity 
When conducting research, several moments need to be addressed with regards to the 
internal validity in the operationalization of the unbalanced data set. For instance, the risk of 
ecological fallacy is present in all studies having variables on an aggregated level due to the 
ambiguous nature and causality concerns between the observations in the sample and the 
individual variables (Gordon, 2015). This could potentially lead to e.g. underestimations of 
founder-controlled firms’ desire to make internationalization decisions compared to firms 
having other owners.  
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The final sample is diminished from 5,228 to 3,048 firm-year observations as described 
in section 3.3.2 to account for the internal validity and erroneous inference of the sample by 
excluding unnecessary interference between the different variables.  
 
3.4.1 Level of significance  
 To explain the foundation of statistical evidence in the regression analyses, one or 
several levels of significance are applied. The intention is to evaluate the precision, correctness 
and prospective generalizability of the results (Gordon, 2015; Bryman & Bell, 2015). The level 
of statistical precision depends on the subject under investigation. Nevertheless, the 5%-level 
is most commonly used in research and will also be applied in this study. However, I will also 
present the accuracy of the regressions at both p<0.01 and p<0.001 in my analyses to better 
capture the statistical coherence and strength between the different variables. The expected 
significance of results is closely correlated to the size of the data sample. The unbalanced data 
set used in this thesis is large compared to other studies, which indicates that we expected 
significant results at a higher statistical percentile (ibid).  
 
3.4.2 Explained variance and F-test  
 R squared (R2) is used to depict the extent of explained variance in the test variable in 
the regression models given the independent and control variables. A higher R2 would indicate 
higher explanatory power of the total variance in the dependent variable under investigation. 
This is a sensitive measure which tends to increase parallelly to the addition of independent 
variables. As such, the study rather applies adjusted R2 which accounts for and adjusts based 
on the number of variables added to the statistical models (Gordon, 2015, chapter 6).  
 Furthermore, I will utilize the F-test in the regressions to evaluate if the addition of one 
or several variables in the models results in a significant contribution to the explanatory strength 
of the variance in the dependent variable. The F-test will be applied at a 5%-level. In particular, 
if the p-value associated with the F-value is very small (0.000), we can conclude that the control 
variables reliably predict the main dependent variable in the models (Gordon, 2015, chapter 6). 
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3.5 Operationalization of variables 
3.5.1 Corporate financial performance measurement  
This study uses return on assets (ROA) as the measurement of corporate performance 
following previous research (Barnett & Salomon, 2012; Barontini & Caprio, 2006; Isakov & 
Weisskopf, 2014; Orlitzky, Schmidt, & Rynes, 2003; Qian, Li, Li, & Qian, 2008). ROA is 
derived as net profit in relation to total assets4 and is not only a standard performance 
measurement, it is also most commonly used in both internationalization literature and founding 
family owner studies (Barontini & Caprio, 2006; Hamberg, Fagerland, & Nilsen, 2013; Qian, 
Li, Li, & Qian, 2008). This paper investigates the relationship between ownership, geographical 
diversification and performance which is ambiguous, and it is uncertain whether performance 
is driven by international expansion of business activities. As such, performance will be both 
included and excluded in the statistical tests. I will also employ the control variable Tobin’s Q 
which is a measure associated with financial performance. Tobin’s Q is further unraveled in 
section 3.5.5 below.  
 
3.5.2 Measures of international activities  
  The extent of foreign activity will be measured using both a main and alternative 
approaches. The former measure is described as FORSALE, while the latter is defined as 
FOREMPL. Both measures are further interpreted below:    
 
FORSALE = the amount of sales outside Sweden, scaled by total sales  
FOREMPL = the number of employees outside Sweden, scaled by total employees  
 
In line with previous studies, the amount of foreign sales is most commonly adopted. 
Following table 1 in Appendix I, it is evident that the majority (approximately 91%) of the listed 
entities in the unbalanced sample determine Sweden as their home market. As previously 
mentioned, Swedish firms listed on the Nasdaq OMX Stockholm Exchange follow a mandate 
to disclose segment reporting and business activities across geographical locations according 
 
4 ROA will be winsorized at the 1%-level to normalize the sample distribution and eliminate extreme values 
which allows for parametric statistical tests. See further explanation in section 3.6.1  
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to the requirements of IFRS 85. Due to the discretionary nature of the standard, firms not 
domiciled in Sweden and having international home markets will not be incorporated in the 
analyses.  
 The alternative measure of foreign activity FOREMPL has been included for robustness 
reasons to strengthen the conditions of the statistical tests. Transparency in financial disclosures 
combined with local Swedish law requires entities to publish information on total salary 
expenses, sick leave and average number of employees – both domestic and non-domestic, for 
each fiscal year. The data on average number of employees are located in each firm’s annual 
report for every fiscal year as described in the section regarding the manual sample collection 
procedure.     
 A final approach of international activities is defined as FORDIV and is measured by 
the number of geographical regions that the firm has employees and subsidiaries. The measure 
is interpreted as follows:  
 
FORDIV = the natural logarithm of the number of geographical regions that the firm is 
present, in each fiscal year 
 
The extent of business activities in regions across borders are derived from either 
internal investment in resources or foreign acquisition of internal resources. Regions are further 
described as areas having several similarities such as economic development, culture and living 
standards. Several previous studies have based the level of internationalization as a percentage 
on e.g. the extent of foreign sales in relation to net profit from business activities in different 
countries. However, an exclusive focus on the number of countries the firm has entered neglects 
the inequalities between markets across borders such as different cultures and trade barriers. 
The latter would for instance be lower between Canada and the US compared to Sweden and 
the US. Hence, the world is segregated into a finite number of markets or regions having similar 
characteristics to navigate the disparities in the internationalization measurement of previous 
researchers (Qian, Li, Li, & Qian, 2008). Contrary to Qian et al. (2008) which suggested ten 
 
5 Listed entities are mandated to follow IFRS 8 on segment reporting in order to disclose information on foreign 
business activities to current and potential investors and stakeholders. 
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global regions, this study adopts thirteen regional economies6 to measure the degree of 
internationalization.  
 
3.5.3 Measures of founder-controlled firms   
 According to Villalonga and Amit (2006), the definition of family firms typically consists 
of three essential aspects which must be identified and differentiated: control, ownership and 
management. Having a family management reduces the asymmetric information distribution 
problem suggested by classical agency theory as the distance between managers and owners is 
eliminated (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Hence, a positive effect is anticipated from founding 
family governance. Nevertheless, this might be partly offset by the costs of maintaining a 
founding family management even though the firm could hire superior managers (Villalonga & 
Amit, 2006). The definition of founding family owners is used to create a dummy variable in 
the data set equal to one when the founder, or founding family, meets the following criteria:  
1) holds a significant part of the capital and serves as the largest single owner of the 
firm,  
2) has significant control of the business, i.e. controls more than ten percent of the voting 
rights, and 
3) employed in top management positions, either engaged as Chairman of the Board, 
CEO of the company or Board Member7.  
 
The firms meeting all three criteria are defined as the variable FOUNDER in the data 
sample. A more general variable FAMILY has also been included to separate the measurement 
of founding family governance from other family firms in the statistical analyses. Another 
dummy variable equal to one is used for all family firms meeting the predefined criteria 1) and 
2) as described above. As such, the main difference between founding family governance and 
 
6 The regional economies include Sweden, other Nordic countries, other EU member firms, other European 
countries (non-EU members), USA and Canada, other American countries, African countries, Middle Eastern 
countries, developed Asian countries (Japan, South Korea and Singapore), China, India, other Asian countries, 
and Oceanian countries. A detailed listing of the data sample is available on request.  
7 In publicly listed firms in the US, internal directors can dominate the Board and be engaged as both Chairman 
and CEO. This is, however, not prohibited by Swedish law. It is a legal requirement that the Boards in Swedish 
publicly listed entities consist of a minimum of three members where the internal corporate executives cannot 
represent more than one out of three seats in the Board of Directors.  
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other family owners is that the latter does not necessarily require employment in top 
management positions in the firm.      
For founder-controlled firms, the total amount of voting rights and thus the degree of 
influence on business decisions are closely associated. Increased percentage of total voting 
rights will naturally indicate greater influence of the firm. This measure is also expected to 
affect most decisions regarding international expansion, type of industry, capital structure of 
the firm (highly leveraged or internally financed), liquidity, etc. In that respect, the relation 
between independent and dependent variables should be compound. Throughout the different 
analyses, I will present coefficients between these variables – both from univariate and 
multivariate regressions. The general impression is that founders or descendants of founders 
are generally less present in executive positions such as CEO or Chairman of the Board due to 
e.g. lack of in-depth competence required for the job. This is illustrated by a decrease of 
approximately 36% in founders holding top management positions between 2001 and 2019 (see 
Appendix I table 2). Such positions are instead replaced by professional managers having 
superior knowledge of the industry.  Nevertheless, founders still hold positions as Board 
Members and keeps a significant share of the voting rights in order to remain control of the 
strategic decision making. The hypothesized relationship between performance of founding 
family firms holding top management positions in contrast to other firms will be analyzed in 
chapter four. Moreover, this will be examined by comparing the original definition of 
FOUNDER as explained above with alternative measures where the founder or founding family 
do not hold top management positions, but instead serve as Board Members. The aim is to 
examine the influence on corporate performance and whether it varies between the different 
interpretations of founders.  
 
3.5.4 Measures of founding family firms where founders hold top management positions   
Building on the description and measurement above on founder-controlled firms, a 
similar approach will be utilized to measure founding family firms where founders hold top 
management positions. According to Villalonga and Amit (2006), the definition of family firms 
typically consists of three fundamental aspects which must be identified and differentiated: 
control, ownership and management. The two first predefined criteria in the founder-definition 
above, i.e. 1) holding a significant part of the capital and serves as the largest single owner of 
the firm, and 2) has significant control of the business, i.e. controls more than ten percent of the 
voting rights - will be utilized in the creation of two new dummy-variables to test the third 
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research hypothesis. The first measure defined as FOUNDERTOP represents all firms meeting 
these criteria where founders employ top management positions such as CEO or Chairman. The 
second measure characterized as FOUNDERBOARD describes all firms meeting the two 
predefined criteria, however the founders serve as Board Members only (see Appendix I, table 
2 for an overview of the founder’s fundamental activity in the firm). Additionally, both 
measures will involve the interaction variables FOUNDERTOPxFORSALES and 
FOUNDERBOARDxFORSALES respectively.   
Unlike previous studies, this paper examines the hypothesized positive relationship 
between financial performance and the founder’s activity in publicly listed firms on Nasdaq 
OMX Stockholm Exchange as outlined by the third research hypothesis. The ultimate goal is 
to investigate whether comparable results to what Anderson & Reeb (2003) found in their study 
on firms listed on the S&P 500 can be achieved in the Swedish institutional setting.   
 
3.5.5 Control variables 
 In addition to the fundamental dependent variables presented above (FORSALE, 
FOREMPL, FORDIV and ROA), this study also employs several control variables which are 
further facilitated below. As previously mentioned, the relationship between dependent and 
independent variables is ambiguous and the coefficients in the different measures from the 
statistical tests need to be interpreted cautiously. The nature of founders’ impact on business 
decisions are likely to affect important judgements such as internationalization, liquidity, 
capital structure, type of industry, etc., which is captured by the FOUNDER-variable. Thus, 
several different regression models will be tested to account for the complex relationship 
between the variables. In addition, a correlation matrix together with results from both 
univariate and multivariate models will be presented. The analyses include year-dummies to 
account for business cycles and to normalize the results. As such, by including year-dummies, 
the corporate performance of firms before and after instances such as the Telecom crash (2001-
02) and the Financial crisis (2008-09) will be normalized over the time period under 
investigation.  
 The ratio of market value to the replacement cost of total assets in each fiscal year is 
called Tobin’s Q. Following previous finance literature, I will use the market value of common 
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equity (market capitalization) plus the book value of interest-bearing debt8 scaled by total assets 
as a proxy for Tobin’s Q (see e.g. Villalonga & Amit (2006)).  
In addition to this measure, several other firm-specific variables are applied which are 
further unraveled below:  
• LOGAGE = the natural logarithm of the numbers of years since original inception until 
the respective fiscal year  
• LIQUIDITY = cash divided by total assets at the end of each fiscal year   
• INTANGIBLE = total intangible assets scaled by total assets at the end of each fiscal 
year to measure intangible asset intensity   
• EFFICIENCY = total sales revenue scaled by total assets at the end of each fiscal year 
to measure production efficiency 
• FINLEV = interest-bearing debt divided by total shareholder equity at the end of each 
fiscal year   
• EMPLOYEE = total number of employees scaled by total assets at the end of each fiscal 
year to measure employee intensity   
• SIZE = the natural logarithm of the market value of equity (market cap) at the end of 
each fiscal year    
• ROA = net profit scaled by total assets at the end of each fiscal year. This measure will 
be applied both as a dependent and control variable when testing the different research 
hypotheses  
• DUAL = entities with dual-classes of shares are assigned a dummy variable of 1 at the 
end of each fiscal year  
• OWNCON = measured as the ownership concentration, i.e. the voting rights controlled 
by the 5 largest shareholders of the firm (in percentage) at the end of each fiscal year  
 
These measures rely on accounting information extracted from the Thomson Reuters 
Eikon Database and the Compustat Global database. Data for LOGAGE is manually collected 
to construct the measure as described above whereas data for DUAL and OWNCON are 
manually collected from SIS Ägarservice. Since the statistical models rely on an exhaustive set 
 
8 By using market value of equity and book value of interest-bearing debt as a proxy for market value of the 
firm, we avoid arbitrary assumptions about amortizations and inflation rates that is required by more 
sophisticated measures of Tobin’s Q.  
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of firm-specific control variables, industry-measures will not be included in the analyses. 
Untabulated year controls will be applied to regulate for intertemporal differences.      
 
3.6 Statistical tests  
 To examine the research hypotheses of this paper and the alleged relationship between 
founding family governance, internationalization and performance, both univariate and 
multivariate regressions are performed. The first research hypotheses (1a and 1b), which are 
“Founding family governance has a negative effect on internationalization” and “Founding 
family governance has a negative impact on geographic diversification”, will be investigated 
using either FORSALES, FOREMPL or FORDIV as dependent variable. The independent 
variables (test variables) in these analyses are FOUNDER or FAMILY together with several 
control variables. To address hypothesis 1a, the two most extensive regression models can be 
derived as follows:  
 
I. FORSALEt = FAMILYt + FOUNDERt + ROAt + TQt + SIZEt + AGEt + FINLEVt 
+ INTANGIBLEt + EMPLOYEEt + EFFICIENCYt + LIQUIDITYt + DUALt + 
OWNCONt + YEAR + Ɛi 
 
II. FOREMPLt = FAMILYt + FOUNDERt + ROAt + TQt + SIZEt + AGEt + FINLEVt 
+ INTANGIBLEt + EMPLOYEEt + EFFICIENCYt + LIQUIDITYt + DUALt + 
OWNCONt + YEAR + Ɛi  
 
In order to answer the first research hypothesis (1a) of the paper, both models will be 
applied using alternative approaches and control variables. Specifically, measures associated 
with corporate performance, i.e. ROA and TQ, will be excluded from some of the statistical 
regression models. These are precluded due to the hypothesized relationship between corporate 
performance and geographical diversification decisions of founder-controlled firms as proposed 
by the second research hypothesis. Furthermore, the control variable SIZE will also be detached 
from some variations of the regressions because the examination of internationalization in 
smaller countries by default indicates a correlation between size and foreign business activities. 
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Hence, it is questionable whether SIZE actually drives the geographical diversification 
decisions of a firm.   
 In particular, FORDIV will be used as the main dependent variable when investigating 
research hypothesis 1b and the extension of it, i.e. whether a gradual increase of ownership 
concentration by the founding family affects geographical diversification decisions. In 
particular, the original definition of FOUNDER will be maintained with minor modifications. 
Instead of applying 10% voting rights as the minimum requirement of control, several 
regressions will be run using 20%, 30% and 50% voting rights to examine whether there is a 
significant difference in internationalization decisions. The model can be formulated as follows:  
 
III. FORDIVt = FAMILYt + FOUNDERt + ROAt + TQt + SIZEt + AGEt + FINLEVt + 
INTANGIBLEt + EMPLOYEEt + EFFICIENCYt + LIQUIDITYt + DUALt + 
OWNCONt + YEAR + Ɛi  
 
The second research hypothesis, which is formulated as “Founding family governance 
has a positive effect on the relationship between geographical expansion and performance” is 
investigated by using the following model:  
 
IV. ROAt = FAMILYt + FOUNDERt + FORSALESt + (FOUNDERt x FORSALESt) + 
SIZEt + AGEt + FINLEVt + INTANGIBLEt + EMPLOYEEt + EFFICIENCYt + 
LIQUIDITYt + DUALt + OWNCONt + YEARt + Ɛi 
 
When analyzing the second research hypothesis, the aim is to examine both the 
interaction between foreign activities and performance of founder-controlled firms as well as 
the separate effects between these measures. Thus, the following test variables added to the 





The third and final research hypothesis is derived as “Founding family firms having 
original founders or descendants in top management positions (CEO or Chairman) will 
outperform other entities”. Model IV presented above will be utilized in order to examine the 
hypothesized relationship, i.e. employing ROA as the essential dependent variable and the two 
variables FOUNDERTOP and FOUNDERBOARD as the fundamental test variables in different 
univariate and multivariate regression models. In addition, the interaction variables 
FOUNDERTOPxFORSALES and FOUNDERBOARDxFORSALES will also be applied, 
respectively.  
 
3.6.1 Normalizing the sample  
 To reduce the impact of skewness and kurtosis in the sample, this paper applies 
“winzoring” on the 1%-level which is a technique used to normalize the sample by accounting 
for business cycles and minimize the impact of extreme values. The reason for this is that 
regression models rely on the assumption of a normal distributed sample (Hamberg, 2012). The 
models will remain the predicted explanatory strength, but extreme observations will be 
replaced by more “normal” values. However, regular extreme observations are essential for the 
analysis. Thus, it is essential to demonstrate that the technique is not supposed to eliminate such 
values. Instead, these are rather substituted with other values providing the possibility to capture 
the effects of for instance internationalization decisions before, during and after events such as 
the Financial crisis (2008-09).  
 
3.6.2 Collinearity  
 Collinearity explains the level of inter-correlation between independent variables in the 
regression model. This is tested to mitigate the risk of an intertwined relationship between 
dependent and independent measures in terms of the predicted strength of the statistical models 
(Hair, Anderson, Tatham, & Black, 1995). The correlations between all variables, both 
dependent and independent, are presented in the different tables in the appendices. If the 
correlation between two of the independent measures equals 0.3 or higher this might indicate 
an exclusion of one of the independent variables (Pallant, 2010). The Variance Inflation Factor 
(VIF) is another measure used to further scrutinize the presence of collinearity. If the 
correlations illustrate a VIF-value of 10 we could argue for an appearance of collinearity. 
Nevertheless, the correlations between the measures in this study illustrate a mean VIF in the 
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range between 1.79 to 2.08 (displayed in the bottom of each regression model output) for all 
variables which demonstrates that the interpretation of the results is not ambiguous.   
In short, this chapter has emphasized and justified the methodological considerations necessary 
to test the research hypotheses as formulated in section two. The underlying data collection 
procedure, the Swedish institutional setting and the statistical models have been explained. 
Additionally, the dependent and independent variables together with the control variables that 
the regressions rely on have been operationalized. Based on the theoretical models presented in 
this section, the following chapter constitutes of both the empirical analyses and the 




















4 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION  
This chapter entails the empirical analyses and corresponding results of the study. The relation 
between founder-controlled firms, internationalization strategies and firm performance will be 
examined and discussed using different statistical approaches. First, the descriptive statistics 
utilized in the paper will be outlined. Subsequently, the correlation analysis between the 
variables will be discussed followed by the findings and interpretation of results from the 
various regression models to answer the research hypotheses formulated in chapter two.  
 
4.1 Descriptive statistics and correlations  
 The descriptive statistics of a sample provides a systematic presentation of the size and 
composition of the total population. Appendix II (table 3) illustrates the properties of the key 
variables applied in the study, including information on observations, mean, standard deviation, 
minimum- and maximum values. These variables are used to assess the relationship between 
founder-controlled firms, international activities and corporate performance. To increase the 
transparency of the results, skewness and kurtosis are also presented in Appendix II, table 3. 
Skewness measures the extent and direction of asymmetry (positively or negatively shifted) in 
the observations. A normal distributed sample should have a skewness of zero. Kurtosis 
indicates the heaviness of both tails in the observations. Samples that are normally distributed 
have a kurtosis of three (Bryman & Bell, 2015, chapter 15).  
 The dependent variables will be explained in more detail. From Appendix II (table 3), 
it is evident that the extent of foreign sales on average is 0.63, ranging from 0 to 1. The variable 
is slightly negatively skewed and is light tailed distributed. The average number of foreign 
employees is 0.47 with minimum and maximum levels of 0 and 1. The sample is somewhat 
normally distributed with a light tail. Geographic diversification, measured as the natural 
logarithm of the numbers of regional economies in which the firm is present, is on average 
0.493 ranging from 0 to 1.079. The sample is positively skewed and marginally light tailed. 
Worth noticing is that n=2,898 observations for this variable. Firms only present in Sweden in 
terms of employees and subsidiaries are not accounted for in this measure. The relatively low 
mean in the foreign diversification measure might be explained by a recent acceleration in 
public listings. Newly listed firms tend to be present in fewer geographical locations compared 
to large mature firms as seen in the data sample, irrespective of the inherent corporate 
governance structure. ROA is a fluctuating measure which is negatively skewed and holds a 
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heavy tail. The mean is slightly positive, indicating that the average firm is asset efficient, i.e. 
profitable in relation to total assets (Anderson & Reeb, 2003).  
Table 4 illustrates a matrix of correlations between dependent, test and firm-specific 
control variables for the total unbalanced sample of n=3,048 firm-year observations.  
 
Table 4: Correlation Matrix 
 
 
Both FORSALES and FOREMPL and FORSALES and FORDIV show a significant 
positive correlation at 0.604 and 0.587 respectively at p<0.05. Furthermore, FORSALES and 
FOUNDER has a significant negative coefficient at 0.181 (p<0.05), while FORSALES and 
FAMILY has a negative association, however not significant at the 5%-level. The matrix of 
correlations further expresses that the measures FORDIV and FAMILY are positively correlated 
at 0.019 whereas FORDIV and FOUNDER have a negative coefficient at -0.034, but none are 
significant at p<0.05. However, these measures take on the expected signs and indicate that the 
average family firm is generally more engaged in international diversification compared to 
founder-controlled firms. These figures support the first research hypothesis (both 1a and 1b) 




All the measures FORSALES, FOREMPL, FORDIV, FAMILY, FOUNDER, SIZE and 
LOGAGE are positively correlated to ROA (p<0.05). Thus, the second research hypothesis is 
supported indicating that both founder-controlled firms and average family firms outperform 
other firms when they engage in international activities. Furthermore, SIZE and LOGAGE are 
positively associated to FORSALES, FOREMPL and FORDIV. This could be explained by that 
large and mature firms, on average, score higher on geographical diversification compared to 
smaller firms. This result is as expected, since larger firms, generally, have more assets and 
resources to spend on foreign activities and commitments.  
 The relationships and results as presented above should be interpreted with caution due 
to the moderate magnitude of the correlations. Furthermore, the analysis does not consider 
industry effects and does not control for year-fixed effects. Hence, to improve reliability of the 
observed relationships, both univariate and multivariate regressions will follow in the 
subsequent sections.  
 Lastly, all regression models present a mean VIF value to account for collinearity 
between the different variables applied in the statistical tests. As explained in section 3.6.2, the 
various regression models illustrate a mean VIF between 1.79 and 2.08 which indicates that the 
risk of an intertwined relationship between the variables is absent. Additionally, all models in 
the different tables have a “Prob > F” equal to 0.000 which indicates that all the control variables 
reliably predict the dependent variable in the regressions. This also emphasizes the underlying 
strength and significance of the various models (Gordon, 2015).  
 
4.2 Founding family governance and the effect on international activities 
To test the first research hypothesis (1a) which is defined as: “Founding family 
governance has a negative effect on internationalization”, both univariate and multivariate 
analyses were conducted. The univariate regressions were performed with both FORSALES and 
FOREMPL as dependent variables. As reflected in table 5 and 6, we see the relationship 
between founding family governance and the extent of international activities for the total 






Table 5: Foreign sales and founding family governance 
 
Variables Univariate Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Family -0.012 0.028                
(-0.35) (0.86)                
Founder -0.110**  -0.096* -0.108** -0.105** 
(-2.90) (-2.43) (-2.83) (-2.99)   
TQ -0.034*** 0.030*** 0.032*** 0.024***
(6.51) (5.12) (5.40) (4.11)   
ROA 0.022  -0.010 0.005  -0.051   
(0.48) (-0.25) (0.12) (-1.40)   
Size 0.095*** 0.066***
(7.34) (4.98)   
LogAge 0.113** 0.113** 0.128*** 0.116** 0.081*  
(3.00) (2.98) (3.41) (3.07) (2.23)   
Finlev 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001   
(1.53) (1.22) (1.47) (1.17) (0.89)   
Intangible 0.007 -0.037 -0.015 -0.032 -0.033
(0.09) (-0.41) (-0.16) (-0.36) (-0.40)   
Employee -0.078*** -0.030 -0.032 -0.027 -0.020
(-4.32) (-1.72) (-1.76) (-1.55) (-1.32)   
Efficiency -0.144*** -0.111** -0.115** -0.110** -0.099**
(-4.75) (-3.19) (-3.11) (-3.11) (-3.02)   
Liquidity 0.275** 0.287** 0.079 0.088 0.157   
(3.13) (2.99) (0.82) (0.95) (1.74)   
Dual 0.008 0.043 0.011 0.043 0.019   
(0.22) (1.19) (0.33) (1.27) (0.56)   
Owncon -0.117 -0.016 -0.097 -0.0002 0.037   
(-1.55) (-0.20) (-1.21) (-0.00) (0.47)   
Constant 0.596*** 0.569*** 0.554*** 0.418***
(5.69) (5.26) (5.19) (4.19)   
N 3 048 3 048 3 048 3 048 3 048
Adjusted R2 - 0,214 0,229 0,246 0,287
Prob > F - 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000
Year-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm clustered std. Error. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean VIF - 1,83 1,79 1,81 1,80
t statistics in parentheses





Table 6: Foreign employees and founding family governance 
 
Variables Univariate Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Family -0.016 -0.019                
(-0.47) (-0.57)                
Founder -0.054 -0.039 -0.039   
(-1.35) (-0.88) (-1.02)   
TQ -0.018* -0.007 -0.021*  
(-2.12) (-0.81) (-2.51)   
ROA 0.132** 0.137** 0.050  
(2.96) (2.75) (1.39)   
Size 0.115*** 0.110***
(8.22) (7.63)   
LogAge 0.171*** 0.177*** 0.171*** 0.109** 
(3.80) (3.98) (3.88) (2.69)   
Finlev 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.002
(1.43) (1.77) (1.86) (1.61)   
Intangible 0.302*** 0.309*** 0.318*** 0.310***
(3.72) (3.40) (3.49) (3.70)   
Employee -0.001 0.011 0.014 0.027   
(-0.08) (0.65) (0.79) (1.44)   
Efficiency -0.053** -0.032 -0.039 -0.021 
(-2.62) (-1.59) (-1.92) (-1.15)   
Liquidity -0.375*** -0.149 -0.121 0.005   
(-3.76) (-1.37) (-1.14) (0.05)   
Dual 0.038 0.045 0.033 0.001   
(1.05) (1.17) (0.89) (0.02)   
Owncon -0.007 -0.005 -0.035 0.046   
(-0.08) (-0.06) (-0.41) (0.60)   
Constant 0.162 0.199 -0.109   
(1.59) (1.93) (-1.12)   
N 3 048 3 048 3 048 3 048
Adjusted R2 - 0,157 0,164 0,271
Prob > F - 0,000 0,000 0,000
Year-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm clustered std. Error. Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean VIF - 1,83 1,79 1,80
t statistics in parentheses





The two most distinct multivariate models applied to address the hypothesized negative 
association adopt FORSALES and FOREMPL as dependent variables respectively and the 
dummy measure FOUNDER as the fundamental test variable. The tables above also report 
coefficients and t-statistics (in parentheses) for the univariate and multivariate regressions 
including statistical significance at p<0.05, p<0.01 and p<0.001. To normalize the sample used 
in the regressions, year-dummies have been included to account for fixed-year effects as well 
as firm-clustered standard errors. Moreover, the multivariate regressions consist of numerous 
firm-specific control variables embedded in the different models which will be further 
interpreted below.  
In line with previous studies, the first regression model employs the extent of foreign 
sales scaled by total sales (FORSALES) as the main measure of international activities. The 
results from the different statistical tests are presented in table 5. As illustrated in the table, the 
adjusted R-square, i.e. the explanatory power of the regression models, improves continuously 
when more firm-specific control variables are added. The univariate analysis strongly 
emphasizes a negative association between FOUNDER and FORSALES (t-stat -2.90 at p<0.01), 
which suggests that founder-controlled firms are interconnected with a lower extent of foreign 
sales.   
Model 1 in table 5 supports the findings from the correlation matrix, that is, we see a 
significant negative association between founding family governance and the extent of foreign 
sales at p<0.05 (t-stat -2.43). When excluding FOUNDER and include performance measures 
(TQ and ROA) in model 2, we see that the average family firm is positively associated with 
foreign sales. However, the finding is not statistically significant which imply that founder-
controlled firms are not substantially less internationalized compared to average family firms.  
Model 3 and 4 in table 5 support the findings in model 1 and contains the most novel 
and important result from the regression models. Firms having founding family governance are 
less internationalized compared to other firms. This association is demonstrated by a negative 
correlation and statistical significance between the test measure FOUNDER and the dependent 
variable FORSALES at p<0.01 (t-statistics between -2.83 and -2.99). The results remain 
significant at the same percentile irrespective of whether we review the univariate or 
multivariate analyses and whether controlling for firm-specific variables such as corporate 
performance (TQ and ROA) and the size measure (SIZE).  
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Several of the firm-specific variables takes on the expected signs in the various models 
in table 5. For instance, SIZE (t-stats between 4.98 and 7.34, all at p<0.001) and LOGAGE (t-
stats between 2.23 and 3.41, at different percentiles) both demonstrate a statistically significant 
relationship to the extent of foreign sales in the multivariate and univariate analyses. This might 
be explained by the fact that mature and established firms tend to have more foreign sales 
compared to newly listed entities. This finding is also supported by the correlation matrix in 
table 4 where both measures have a significant positive correlation with FORSALES at the 5%-
level.   
Interestingly, the corporate performance measure TQ has a significant negative 
coefficient with FORSALES in the univariate analysis (p<0.001). However, we see a 
statistically significant positive association when different firm-specific control variables are 
added to the models as evident in model 2-4 in table 5 (t-stats between 4.11 and 5.40, all at 
p<0.001).  
The alternative measure of foreign activity FOREMPL is applied as the dependent 
variable illustrated by table 6. From the univariate analysis, both FAMILY and FOUNDER are 
negatively correlated to FOREMPL, however not statistically significant. Contrary, both SIZE 
and LOGAGE are significant at p<0.001 which proves that the number of foreign employees is 
closely associated to the maturity and size of the firm as expected. The univariate analysis 
further demonstrates that the extent of foreign employees is associated to enhanced financial 
performance measured by ROA (t-stat 2.96 at p<0.01). When adjusting for size and corporate 
performance measures in model 1, the coefficient for LOGAGE remains statistically significant 
at p<0.001. FOUNDER is still negatively associated to FOREMPL but not significant, 
indicating that founder-controlled firms are not significantly less internationalized in terms of 
employees compared to the average family firms.  
Model 2 in table 6 further supports the univariate analysis, that is, both corporate 
performance and maturity noted as LOGAGE are positively correlated to FOREMPL (t-stat 2.75 
at p<0.01 and t-stat 3.88 at p<0.001 respectively). Model 3 still demonstrates a negative 
relationship between founding family governance and the number of foreign employees, yet 
not statistically significant. Nevertheless, this model includes the highest adjusted R-square 
illustrating the explanatory power of the model. However, despite insignificant results for the 
FOUNDER variable, the correlation matrix in table 4 illustrates a significant negative 
correlation between founding family ownership and the number of foreign employees. This 
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further supports the hypothesized association between founding family governance and 
international activities as formulated in hypothesis 1a.  
Another important finding is that the variable FAMILY, which represents all the 
founding family firms and average family firms, is not statistically significant in the univariate 
and multivariate regressions for FORSALES and FOREMPL (t-stats between -0.35 and 0.86). 
These results indicate that the average family-controlled firm does not have significantly fewer 
international activities compared to other firms. Hence, the association indicates that founder-
controlled firms are less internationalized because they are controlled by a founding family and 
not because they are family firms per se.  
Other firm-specific control variables have statistically significant results. In particular, 
the dependent variable FORSALES are associated to TQ, SIZE, LOGAGE, EFFICIENCY and 
LIQUIDITY. Moreover, ROA, SIZE, LOGAGE and INTANGIBLE are associated with 
FOREMPL. The presented results acknowledge the hypothesized negative relationship in 
hypothesis 1b between founding family governance and the extent of internationalization.    
 
In conclusion, the first research hypothesis (1a) is supported by the empirical data and results, 
i.e. that there is a negative association between founding family governance and the extent of 
international activities. The findings demonstrate that founder-controlled firms are generally 
less internationalized compared to the average family firm and other owners. To further 
investigate the correlation between ownership type and the presence in geographical regions, 
FORDIV will be used as the main dependent variable in the following section in the 
investigation of hypothesis 1b.  
 
4.3 Founding family governance and the presence in geographical regions   
 In line with section 4.2, this chapter examines the first research hypothesis (1b) and the 
association between ownership and geographical diversification. As previously mentioned, this 
paper follows the approach by Qian et al. (2008) which suggested ten global regions. However, 
this study adopts thirteen regional economies9 in the examination of geographical presence and 
corporate governance (see section 3.5.2 for further explanation). The number of geographical 
regions varies through the total unbalanced sample of n=3,048 firm-year observation. However, 
 
9 Details of the geographical segment distribution are excluded from the paper, but available on request.  
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most firms are present in fewer than four regional economies (approximately 60% of the total 
sample) which is characterized by low degree of geographical presence. The clear tendency is 
a gradual internationalization process which can be associated to the number of years since the 
firm’s original inception. Thus, newly listed entities on the Nasdaq OMX Stockholm Exchange 
seem to be less internationalized compared to large mature firms. The most common region is 
the Nordics, followed by EU-countries and North America. Only ten percent of the total sample 
can be characterized by high degree of geographic diversification, i.e. they are present in more 
than ten regional economies.    
Table 7 below illustrates the results from the statistical regressions executed with 
FORDIV as the dependent variable for n=2,898 firm-year observations between 2001 and 2019. 
Noteworthy, the total number of observations are fewer compared to the previous sections 
(n=3,048 firm-year observations) due to missing information on regional economies. FORDIV 
is, as previously mentioned, measured as the number of geographical regions in that a firm has 
employees and subsidiaries10. Following the former regression models in this study, FOUNDER 
is still applied as the main test variable.   
To test the hypothesized negative association between founding family governance and 
geographical diversification, both univariate and multivariate analyses have been performed.  
As reflected in table 7, we see the coefficients and t-statistics (in parentheses) for the regressions 
including statistical significance at p<0.05, p<0.01 and p<0.001. To normalize the data sample, 
year-dummies have been included to account for fixed-year effects. Additionally, firm-
clustered standard errors have been incorporated for similar purposes. The multivariate 
regressions consist of numerous firm-specific control variables embedded in the different 
models which will be further interpreted below. Table 7 also demonstrates that the explanatory 
power of the statistical models (adjusted R-square) improves continuously with the addition of 
firm-specific control variables. 
The results from the univariate analyses illustrate that FORDIV and ROA are positively 
associated (t-stat 3.25 at p<0.01). Furthermore, both SIZE and LOGAGE have statistically 
significant coefficients to FORDIV (t-stats 10.86 and 4.46 respectively, both at p<0.001). 
Hence, such measures will have substantial impact on international diversification as newly 
listed firms tend to be less geographically diversified compared to mature and large entities.  
 











Variables Univariate Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Univariate Model 5 Univariate Model 6 Univariate Model 7
Family 0.011 -0.017 0.011 0.011 0.011
(0.24) (-0.40) (0.24) (0.24) (0.24)
Founder -0.02 -0.078 -0.095* -0.051 -0.031 -0.107* -0.034 -0.115* -0.073 -0.163**
(-0.40) (-1.36) (-2.00)   (-1.18) (-0.68) (-2.35) (-0.76) (-2.46) (-1.51) (-3.30)
TQ -0.004 0.001 0.002                -0.020** -0.004 -0.004 -0.004
(-0.55) (0.06) (0.20)                (-2.76) (-0.55) (-0.55) (-0.55)
ROA 0.181** 0.177** 0.186**                -0.0001 0.181** 0.181** 0.181**
(3.25) (3.07) (3.16)                (-0.00) (3.25) (3.25) (3.25)
Size 0.167*** 0.165*** 0.153*** 0.167*** 0.162*** 0.167*** 0.163*** 0.167*** 0.162***
(10.86) (11.10)   (10.17) (10.86) (10.94) (10.86) (11.01) (10.86) (10.99)
LogAge 0.232***                0.114** 0.232*** 0.232*** 0.232***
(4.46)                (2.59) (4.46) (4.46) (4.46)
Finlev 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.001
(1.24) (0.52) (0.46) (0.78)   (0.49) (1.24) (0.66) (1.24) (0.66) (1.24) (0.66)
Intangible 0.028 -0.102 -0.109 0.052   0.026 0.028 0.052 0.028 0.053 0.028 0.039
(0.28) (-0.90) (-0.98) (0.61)   (0.27) (0.28) (0.61) (0.28) (0.63) (0.28) (0.47)
Employee -0.032 0.011 0.014 -0.003 0.020 -0.032 -0.004 -0.032 -0.003 -0.032 -0.005
(-1.88) (0.55) (0.71) (-0.23)   (1.18) (-1.88) (-0.24) (-1.88) (-0.21) (-1.88) (-0.30)
Efficiency -0.115*** -0.134** -0.132**                -0.082** -0.115*** -0.115*** -0.115***
(-4.25) (-3.29) (-3.23)                (-2.78) (-4.25) (-4.25) (-4.25)
Liquidity -0.239* -0.317* -0.293* -0.102  0.033 -0.239* -0.114 -0.239* -0.111 -0.239* -0.135
(-2.06) (-2.31) (-2.13) (-1.01)   (0.28) (-2.06) (-1.11) (-2.06) (-1.08) (-2.06) (-1.34)
Dual -0.115** 0.102* 0.119* 0.064 0.046 -0.115** 0.074 -0.115** 0.072 -0.115** 0.069
(2.65) (2.06) (2.29) (1.53)   (1.12) (2.65) (1.78) (2.65) (1.75) (2.65) (1.75)
Owncon 0.127 0.0042 0.049 0.152 0.139 0.127 0.181* 0.127 0.192* 0.127 0.219*
(1.33) (0.04) (0.43) (1.67)   (1.64) (1.33) (1.99) (1.33) (2.18) (1.33) (2.43)
Constant 0.663*** 0.630*** -0.149   -0.144 -0.136 -0.146 -0.149
(6.17) (5.74) (-1.96)   (-1.33) (-1.77) (-1.86) (-1.90)
N 2 898 2 898 2 898 2 898 2 898 2 898 2 898 2 898 2 898 2 898 2 898
Adjusted R2 - 0,112 0,118 0,276 0,324 - 0,290 - 0,280 - 0,290
Prob > F - 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 - 0,00 - 0,00 - 0,00
Year-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm clustered std. Error. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean VIF - 1,82 1,83 1,82 1,82 - 1,83 - 1,83 - 1,82
t statistics in parentheses








Model 1 and 2 in table 7 substantiate the corporate performance measure ROA which is 
statistically significant in both models at p<0.01 when accounting for SIZE and LOGAGE. 
However, models 1 and 2 do not express a statistically significant correlation between founding 
family governance or average family firms and geographical diversification.  Although not 
statistically significant, FAMILY in model 1 and FOUNDER in model 2 both have negative 
associations with FORDIV as hypothesized in the first research question. Similar results are 
seen in model 4 which does not illustrate statistically significant results for FOUNDER. As 
such, the results are dependent on which control variables the analyses account for.  
Model 3 presents a novel and important finding. By excluding the measures for 
corporate performance (ROA and TQ), LOGAGE, EFFICIENCY and FAMILY, we see a clear 
negative connection between the coefficient for FOUNDER and FORDIV (t-stat -2.00 at 
p<0.05). These results indicate that founder-controlled firms indeed seem to be less 
geographically diversified compared to other owners as suggested by theory and the second 
hypothesis.  
Other firm-specific control variables have statistically significant results. For instance, 
the dependent variable FORDIV is associated to ROA, TQ, SIZE, LOGAGE, EFFICIENCY, 
LIQUIDITY and DUAL. The presented results acknowledge the hypothesized negative 
relationship in hypothesis 1b between founding family governance and the extent of 
geographical diversification.  
 
4.3.1 Increased ownership concentration and the presence in geographical regions   
 As an extension of the first hypothesis (1b), both univariate and multivariate regressions 
have been performed containing different interpretations of the FOUNDER-measure as the 
main test variable. Especially, table 7 above presents the results from regressions where the 
founding family holds 20%, 30% and 50% of the voting rights respectively and the various 
impact on foreign diversification (FORDIV).  
 In the univariate analyses, none of the revised founder-interpretations have statistically 
significant coefficients to FORDIV, irrespective of the extent of voting rights. Nonetheless, the 
t-stat for FOUNDER decreases gradually with the increase in voting rights.  
 The different multivariate regressions presented in table 7 contain interesting results. 
When adjusting for corporate performance measures (TQ and ROA), LOGAGE and 
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EFFICIENCY, we see that the t-statistics for the FOUNDER variable gradually decreases with 
ownership concentration in models 5-7. All these control variables have statistically significant 
associations to FORDIV, except TQ, in the univariate analyses at either p<0.01 or p<0.001. This 
can be explained by the fact that large mature firms, which in general are positively associated 
to corporate performance measures as assessed by the second hypothesis, seem to be present in 
more geographical regions compared to newly established entities. As such, these measures are 
excluded in the multivariate models 5-7 in table 7. In particular, the coefficients for FOUNDER 
in table 7 are positively associated to FORDIV (t-stats between -2.35 and -2.46 at p<0.05). 
However, when increasing the ownership concentration by the founding family to 50% voting 
rights as evident in model 7, the measure FOUNDER decreases significantly (t-stat -3.30 at 
p<0.01). This demonstrates strong evidence to support the proposed hypothesis. This is a novel 
and important result which clearly underlines that founding family governance exhibit 
increased caution and risk-averse behavior parallelly to increased control of the company in 
terms of voting rights. As such, founder-controlled are less geographically diversified compared 
to other firms, not because they are controlled by a family but because they are owned by the 
original founder. 
To summarize, the first research hypothesis (1b) is supported by the empirical data and results, 
i.e. that there is a negative association between founding family governance and the extent of 
geographical diversification. The findings further reinforce the results from chapter 4.2 
regarding international activities and founding family governance. Furthermore, the results 
prove that founder-controlled firms, in general, are present in fewer geographical regions 
compared to other owners. These findings are even stronger when the voting rights of the 
founding family gradually increases from 10% to 50%. To explore what drives the association 
between corporate performance, founder-controlled firms and foreign activity, the following 
part will investigate this relationship in more detail.  
 
4.4 Corporate performance, founder-controlled firms and foreign activity  
 The aim of this section is to investigate research hypothesis 2 which is formulated as 
“founding family governance has a positive effect on the relationship between geographical 
expansion and performance”. Table 8 reports coefficients and t-statistics (in parentheses) for 
both univariate and multivariate regressions including statistical significance at p<0.05, p<0.01 
and p<0.001. To normalize the sample used in the regressions, year-dummies are incorporated 
to account for fixed-year effects as well as inclusion of firm-clustered standard errors.   
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Table 8: Financial performance, international activities and founding family governance 
 
Variables Univariate Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Family 0.036* 0.024                
(2.00) (1.41)                
Founder 0.071*** 0.049*** 0.046*** 0.008   
(5.25) (3.36) (3.34) (0.28)   
ForSales 0.128 -0.021 -0.038   
(0.50) (-0.75) (-1.20)   
FoundxForsales 0.118*** 0.066
(5.90) (1.61)   
Size 0.053*** 0.052*** 0.050*** 0.052*** 0.052***
(7.79) (8.40) (8.45) (7.82) (7.86)   
LogAge 0.067*** 0.029 0.033* 0.035 0.035   
(3.41) (1.75) (1.97) (1.94) (1.95)   
Finlev -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001   
(-0.56) (-0.52) (-0.55) (-0.54) (-0.53)   
Intangible -0.115*** -0.031 -0.023 -0.024 -0.027  
(-3.60) (-1.03) (-0.78) (-0.81) (-0.90)   
Employee -0.011 -0.027** -0.028** -0.029** -0.027** 
(-1.54) (-3.17) (-3.28) (-3.30) (-3.08)   
Efficiency 0.030** 0.052*** 0.051*** 0.048** 0.048** 
(2.60) (3.41) (3.35) (3.28) (3.25)   
Liquidity -0.050 0.007 -0.011 -0.005 -0.008 
(-0.64) (0.10) (-0.16) (-0.07) (-0.12)   
Dual 0.054*** 0.010 0.002 0.002 0.003   
(3.42) (0.65) (0.13) (0.15) (0.21)   
Owncon 0.144*** 0.100* 0.079 0.079 0.080
(3.88) (2.30) (1.78) (1.80) (1.81)   
Constant -0.263*** -0.242*** -0.234*** -0.223***
(-4.91) (-4.81) (-4.74) (-4.43)   
N 3 048 3 048 3 048 3 048 3 048
Adjusted R2 - 0,155 0,159 0,159 0,160
Prob > F - 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000
Year-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm clustered std. Error. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean VIF - 1,80 1,81 1,81 2,08
t statistics in parentheses





Table 8 above illustrates the relationship between corporate performance (ROA 
employed as the dependent variable) and founding family governance for the total sample of 
3,048 firm-year observations between the fiscal years 2001 and 2019. As the table displays, the 
adjusted R-square improves continuously when more firm-specific control variables are added 
to the models. Measures such as FOUNDER, SIZE and LOGAGE are all positively correlated 
with ROA as indicated by the correlation matrix presented in table 4 (p<0.05). The results from 
the univariate models in table 8 further support this finding. Especially, all these measures are 
statistically significant in the univariate models at p<0.001 (t-stats between 3.41 and 7.79).     
The different univariate and multivariate analyses generally show a positive coefficient 
for FOUNDER at p<0.001 (except model 4) irrespective of which firm-specific control 
variables are included in the models. Several of the coefficients in the univariate analysis 
demonstrate a significant coherence to the profitability measure in the analyses. In particular, 
we see positive correlations between for instance the measures SIZE and LOGAGE to ROA 
which is expected due to the uncertain nature of newly established entities. Furthermore, the 
findings from the univariate analyses exhibit a statistically significant relationship for both 
FOUNDER (t-stat 5.25 at p<0.001) and the interaction variable FOUNDxFORSALES (t-stat 
5.90 at p<0.001) which is in line with the hypothesized positive relation between founding 
family governance and profitability when such firms internationalize. Moreover, the univariate 
analysis emphasizes that the average family firm has a positive association to corporate 
performance at p<0.05 (t-stat 2.00). Contrary to the univariate analysis, the average family firm 
(FAMILY) does not perform better than other firms as evident by model 1 in table 8 when 
accounting for firm-specific control variables (t-stat 1.41).  
The coefficient for FOUNDER tends to have a positive association to ROA in both the 
univariate and multivariate models. Notably, being geographically diversified does not 
necessarily correspond to better performance as illustrated by FORSALES (not statistically 
significant in the univariate or multivariate models). As illustrated by model 2, the measure 
FOUNDER is statistically significant (t-stat 3.36 at p<0.001) for founder-controlled firms that 
do not have foreign sales and as such these firms seem to outperform other firms, irrespective 
of international activities. If we add FORSALES to model 3, we see that founder-controlled 
firms that increase their foreign commitment in terms of non-domestic sales still outperform 
other firms (t-stat 3.34 at p<0.001). Nevertheless, FORSALES is not statistically significant in 
the various approaches which clearly underline that increased foreign commitment does not 
necessarily result in amended corporate performance.  
48 
 
However, when including the interaction variable FOUNDxFORSALES as illustrated in 
model 4, founder-controlled firms that increase their foreign commitment do not find significant 
proof of better financial performance. Nevertheless, the results exhibit the expected sign and 
thus founding family governance illustrates a positive coherence to financial performance, 
although not statistically significant (t-stat 1.61).  
 Regardless of which variables the various models account for, the measure SIZE is 
statistically significant in all models. This finding is as expected and in line with the positive 
correlation in the matrix as presented in table 4 (significant at the 0.05 level). Interestingly, 
EMPLOYEE has a statistically significant coefficient in all the multivariate regressions which 
indicates that employee intensity is negatively associated to financial performance (t-stats 
between -3.08 and -3.30 at p<0.01).  
 To summarize, it is evident that the average family firm does not perform better than 
other entities as the multivariate regression in model 1 does not demonstrate statistically 
significant results.  However, the results clearly demonstrate that founder-controlled firms 
outperform other owners, irrespective whether accounting for foreign sales (model 2 and 3). 
Nevertheless, the results do not exhibit statistical proof of enhanced corporate performance for 
founding family governance when international activities are increased (model 4).  
Table 9 below includes FORDIV to measure geographic diversification in relation to 
corporate performance (ROA as dependent variable). Due to missing firm-year observations on 
foreign locations the sample is somewhat lower compared to previous analyses when FORDIV 
is included as a control variable (n=2,898 versus n=3,048). Similar to table 8 above, model 1 in 
table 9 demonstrates comparable findings, i.e. the average family firm does not have better 
corporate performance compared to other firms. However, founder-controlled firms seem to 
outperform other firms when they internationalize as illustrated by model 2-4 (t-stats between 
3.19 and 3.41 at p<0.001).  
Model 3 and 4 in table 9 does not indicate a statistically significant relationship between 
corporate performance and the presence in geographical regions (FORDIV not statistically 
significant). Nevertheless, the negative coefficient for the interaction variable 
FOUNDERxFORDIV in model 4 proves that the profitability of founder-controlled firms 
benefits from a concentration of foreign commitment to relatively few regional economies (t-
stat -2.64 at p<0.01). This is also reflected in the FOUNDER measure which is statistically 
significant at p<0.001 (t-stat 3.41).    
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Table 9: Financial performance, foreign diversification and founding family governance 
 
Variables Univariate Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Family 0.036* 0.024                
(2.00) (1.41)                
Founder 0.071*** 0.049*** 0.047** 0.088***
(5.25) (3.36) (3.19) (3.41)   
Fordiv 0.064*** -0.009 0.012
(3.87) (-0.52) (0.63)   
FounderxFordiv 0.080*** -0.078** 
(4.42) (-2.64)   
Size 0.052*** 0.052*** 0.050*** 0.050*** 0.049***
(7.79) (8.40) (8.45) (7.90) (7.78)   
LogAge 0.067*** 0.029 0.033* 0.035* 0.033 
(3.41) (1.75) (1.97) (1.98) (1.88)   
Finlev -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(-0.56) (-0.52) (-0.55) (-0.52) (-0.55)   
Intangible -0.115*** -0.031 -0.023 -0.016 -0.016   
(-3.60) (-1.03) (-0.78) (-0.60) (-0.59)   
Employee -0.011 -0.027** -0.028** -0.025** -0.026** 
(-1.54) (-3.17) (-3.28) (-3.10) (-3.24)   
Efficiency 0.030** 0.052*** 0.051*** 0.040** 0.040** 
(2.60) (3.41) (3.35) (2.96) (2.99)   
Liquidity -0.050 0.007 -0.011 0.024 0.024  
(-0.64) (0.10) (-0.16) (0.33) (0.32)   
Dual 0.054*** 0.010 0.002 0.002 -0.001  
(3.42) (0.65) (0.13) (0.10) (-0.05)   
Owncon 0.144*** 0.100* 0.079 0.067 0.063 
(3.88) (2.30) (1.78) (1.49) (1.40)   
Constant -0.263*** -0.242*** -0.230*** -0.231***
(-4.91) (-4.81) (-4.43) (-4.44)   
N 2 898 3 048 3 048 2 898 2 898
Adjusted R2 - 0,155 0,159 0,151 0,153
Prob > F - 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000
Year-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm clustered std. Error. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean VIF - 1,80 1,81 1,82 1,99
t statistics in parentheses





 Comparable to the models in table 8, we see that the control variable SIZE is statistically 
significant at the p<0.001 percentile regardless of the applied control-variables. Additionally, 
several of the control variables have stand-alone significant positive association to ROA in the 
univariate analyses. This includes measures such as FAMILY (t-stat 2.00), FOUNDER (t-stat 
5.25), FORDIV (t-stat 3.87), FOUNDERxFORDIV (t-stat 4.42) and LOGAGE (t-stat 3.41) 
which is in line with the presented matrix of correlations in table 4 (significant at the 0.05 level).  
 
In summary, the results clearly demonstrate and support the hypothesized positive relationship 
between founding-family governance, geographical diversification and corporate performance 
as formulated in the second research question. The average family firm does not perform better 
than other owners. However, the corporate performance of founding family firms is 
significantly better than other entities and seems to be enhanced from the presence in fewer 
rather than several geographical regions.  
 
4.5 Performance of founding family governance where founders hold top management positions  
 This section examines the third and final research hypothesis, i.e. “founding family firms 
having original founders or descendants in top management positions (CEO or Chairman) will 
outperform other entities”. ROA is still employed as the main dependent variables similar to 
previous sections. As before, table 10 and 11 depict coefficients and t-statistics (in parentheses) 
for both univariate and multivariate regressions including statistical significance at p<0.05, 
p<0.01 and p<0.001. To normalize the sample used in the regressions, year-dummies are 
incorporated to account for fixed-year effects as well as inclusion of firm-clustered standard 
errors. All models obtain a higher degree of explanatory power (adjusted R-square) parallelly 
to an addition of control variables.  
 Table 10 utilizes the original definition of founder with minor modifications, i.e. it 
includes only founding family firms where the founders or descendants hold top management 
positions (CEO or Chairman of the board). Contrary, table 11 presents founding family firms 
where founders or their descendants serve as board members only (see Appendix I table 2 for 
a more detailed distribution of the founder’s activity in the firm). In the univariate analyses, 
both FOUNDERTOP and FOUNDERBOARD together with the interaction variables have 
positive associations to “ROA” at p<0.001 (t-stats between 3.83 to 6.49) which is in line with 
expectations and the presented theory that founding family firms outperform other entities.  
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Table 10: Financial performance, international activities and founding family governance 
(Executive) 
 
Variables Univariate Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Family 0.036*                               
(2.00)                               
FounderTop 0.061*** 0.045** 0.043** 0.004  0.045** 
(4.02) (2.87) (2.83) (0.14)   (2.74)   
ForSales 0.128 -0.027 -0.037 0.024   
(0.50) (-0.93) (-1.21) (0.84)   
FoundertopxForsales 0.110*** 0.071 
(6.49) (1.53)   
Size 0.053*** 0.051*** 0.053*** 0.053***
(7.79) (8.45) (7.92) (7.97)   
LogAge 0.067*** 0.034* 0.036 0.036 0.060** 
(3.41) (1.97) (1.96) (1.96)   (2.82)   
Finlev -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001   -0.001
(-0.56) (-0.55) (-0.55) (-0.54)   (-0.47)   
Intangible -0.115*** -0.029 -0.029 -0.031   -0.030  
(-3.60) (-0.96) (-1.00) (-1.06)   (-0.95)   
Employee -0.011 -0.029** -0.029** -0.027** -0.035***
(-1.54) (-3.29) (-3.31) (-3.06)   (-3.35)   
Efficiency 0.030** 0.052*** 0.049** 0.049** 0.048** 
(2.60) (3.36) (3.28) (3.25)   (3.15)   
Liquidity -0.050 -0.008 0.0002 -0.005 -0.026   
(-0.64) (-0.11) (0.00) (-0.07)   (-0.37)   
Dual 0.054*** 0.007 0.007 0.008 0.027  
(3.42) (0.45) (0.44) (0.50)   (1.54)   
Owncon 0.144*** 0.089* 0.089* 0.086*  0.064   
(3.88) (2.03) (2.03) (1.92)   (1.34)   
Constant -0.247*** -0.236*** -0.227*** -0.124** 
(-4.89) (-4.78) (-4.48)  (-2.60) 
N 3 048 3 048 3 048 3 048 3 048
Adjusted R2 - 0,157 0,157 0,158 0,112
Prob > F - 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000
Year-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm clustered std. Error. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean VIF - 1,80 1,80 2,04 1,80
t statistics in parentheses
* p<0.05, **p<0.01, *** p<0.001




Table 11: Financial performance, international activities and founding family governance 
(Board) 
 
Variables Univariate Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Family 0.036*
(2.00)
FounderBoard 0.060*** 0.020 0.018 -0.016  0.027   
(3.83) (1.46) (1.28) (-0.45)   (1.85)   
ForSales 0.128 -0.029 -0.034  0.023   
(0.50) (-1.00) (-1.18)   (0.77)   
FounderboardxForsales 0.098*** 0.059
(4.25) (1.06)   
Size 0.053*** 0.051*** 0.053*** 0.053***                
(7.79) (8.28) (7.74) (7.72)                  
LogAge 0.067*** 0.028 0.031 0.031 0.054** 
(3.41) (1.73) (1.74) (1.75)   (2.65)   
Finlev -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(-0.56) (-0.54) (-0.53) (-0.53)   (-0.46)   
Intangible -0.115*** -0.029 -0.0299 -0.0305   -0.0296   
(-3.60) (-0.97) (-1.02) (-1.04)   (-0.95)   
Employee -0.011 -0.026** -0.027** -0.027** -0.033** 
(-1.54) (-3.14) (-3.19) (-3.20)   (-3.23)   
Efficiency 0.030** 0.052*** 0.049** 0.049** 0.048** 
(2.60) (3.36) (3.28) (3.28)   (3.15)   
Liquidity -0.050 0.0002 0.008 0.009  -0.018   
(-0.64) (0.00) (0.12) (0.13)   (-0.25)   
Dual 0.054*** 0.013 0.013 0.013   0.032  
(3.42) (0.78) (0.77) (0.76)   (1.79)   
Owncon 0.144*** 0.111** 0.110** 0.112** 0.084
(3.88) (2.64) (2.61) (2.66)   (1.86)   
Constant -0.251*** -0.239*** -0.237*** -0.128** 
(-4.91) (-4.81) (-4.77)   (-2.63) 
N 3 048 3 048 3 048 3 048 3 048
Adjusted R2 - 0,153 0,154 0,154 0,110
Prob > F - 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000
Year-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm clustered std. Error. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean VIF - 1,79 1,78 2,03 1,79
t statistics in parentheses





 If we compare the two tables, the measure FOUNDERBOARD is not statistically 
significant in the various multivariate regressions. However, FOUNDERTOP is statistically 
significant in all models except model 3 (t-stats between 2.74 to 2.87 at p<0.01), regardless of 
the control variables accounted for. The findings presented by model 3 in both tables are in line 
with the findings in table 8, i.e. that founder-controlled firms that increase foreign commitment 
(illustrated by the interaction variable) are not automatically associated to enhanced corporate 
performance. Fascinatingly, despite exhibit statistically significant results, founding family 
firms employing founders in executive positions have a positive coefficient to corporate 
performance contrary to such firms with founders serving as board members only which display 
a negative association to ROA. These findings are in line with the hypothesized relationship 
between corporate performance and top managerial positions for founding family governance 
firms. Although restricting top management positions to a labor pool of family members can be 
questionable, active family management can indeed lead to enhanced performance compared 
to nonfamily firms (Anderson & Reeb, 2003). The empirical tests find strong evidence to 
support this. In particular, founding family firms with founders in executive positions have 
statistically significant positive associations with corporate performance relative to founder-
controlled family owners where founders serve as board members only.     
Another interesting finding is that when adjusting for FAMILY, we see that founder-
controlled firms that increase their foreign commitment (illustrated by FORSALES) have 
amended corporate performance illustrated in model 2 and 4 in table 10 (t-stat 2.83 and 2.74 
respectively at p<0.01). Nevertheless, FORSALES is not statistically significant in the various 
approaches in table 10 and 11 which clearly underlines that increased foreign commitment does 
not necessarily result in enhanced profitability. However, the results from model 3 are 
somewhat disappointing as they suggest that active founders that internationalize as illustrated 
by the interaction variable are not performing better than other owners.   
 
In short, this chapter has presented and discussed the empirical results from the statistical 
regression models. The general tendency is that founding family governance seem to have 
adverse effects on geographical diversification decisions. Nevertheless, when such firms 
engage in international activities, they outperform other owners – especially when founders 
employ top management positions. The following section will conclude the findings presented 




The aim of this study has been to investigate whether founding family governance affects 
internationalization strategies and the corporate performance of Swedish firms listed on Nasdaq 
OMX Stockholm Exchange. By manual collection of accounting information from the annual 
reports of 606 unique listed entities over a time period of 19 years resulted in a total of 5,228 
firm-year observation as illustrated in table 1 (Appendix I). In line with former studies, the 
sample was narrowed to 3,048 firm-year observations. From the data sample, I created different 
variables to measure both the extent of foreign sales, the number of international employees 
and the degree of geographical locations of business operations. In order to answer the overall 
research hypotheses of the paper, several univariate and multivariate regressions have been 
performed. This chapter will summarize the main findings and results, discuss the contribution 
of the thesis and present delimitations to the paper. Finally, suggestions for future research 
within the theoretical landscape of founding family firms will be provided.   
 
5.1 Overall empirical results  
 In this study, many different regression models, disparate test variable definitions and 
different combinations of control variables have been applied. Consequently, an ambiguity 
appears in the interpretation of the results. Having that said, the overall findings point in a 
direction that confirms the proposed research hypotheses of this paper.  
 According to the first hypotheses (1a and 1b), a negative relationship between founding 
family governance and internationalization was predicted. The assumed effect was investigated 
using different measures for international activities. Results from the statistical regressions 
confirmed the hypotheses and clearly demonstrated that founding family governance has a 
negative impact on both the extent of foreign sales and the geographical diversification 
compared to other firms. In particular, as an extension of hypothesis 1b, founding family firms 
with a gradual increase of ownership concentration for the founder (measured by voting rights) 
were less geographically diversified compared to other entities. These findings are in line with 
the Uppsala Process Model for internationalization which suggests that founding family owners 
are cautious, risk-averse and favor long-term sustainable growth strategies rather than 
unnecessary risk-taking for short-term gains that may be disruptive for the long-term survival 
of the firm (Johanson & Vahlne, 1977). As such, founding family firms benefit from an 
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incremental internationalization process, step by step, in order to maintain control of the 
business.   
 The second hypothesis emphasized a positive relationship between founding family 
governance and corporate performance (ROA). The findings suggest that founder-controlled 
firms indeed perform better than other firms when they engage in international activities. This 
is in line with previous finance literature which found strong results for the positive association 
between corporate performance and founding family ownership. The same peculiarities that 
resulted in lower degree of international activities as evidenced by the first hypotheses apply to 
the enhanced performance of founder-controlled firms when they make internationalization 
decisions. These characteristics include caution and conservatism in strategic business 
decisions, risk-averse behavior and the desire to maintain control. Similar to the arguments 
above, because founder-controlled family firms expel such qualities, they invest in sustainable 
long-term strategies and undertake lower risks, which in turn leads to enhanced corporate 
performance compared to other enterprises.   
 Deriving from the second hypothesis, the third and final research hypothesis predicted 
that founder-controlled firms where the founders or heirs hold executive positions (CEO or 
Chairman of the Board) would outperform founding family owners when founders or 
descendants serve as board members only. The empirical analyses found strong support for the 
hypothesized relationship, indicating that active family management and involvement is 
beneficial and a competitive advantage for listed firms in the Swedish institutional setting. 
Contrary, a clear tendency of substituting founders in managerial position to outside 
professional can be seen during the time period under investigation as evident in table 1 
(Appendix I). However, the results revealed that greater corporate performance in family firms, 
relative to other owners, derived from firms that have founders in top executive positions 
compared to founder-controlled firms having founders as board members only. One 
interpretation is that the founding family have better understanding of the business and that 
actively involved family members consider themselves as stewards of the entity. Furthermore, 
the agency costs are likely to be higher with outside professionals in managerial positions 
indicating an inverse relationship between agency costs and managerial ownership.  
 As a final remark, what does the results imply and what do they mean to society? 
Through this study, I have learned that founding family firms have an incremental approach in 
their internationalization process, they create more value and are more profitable compared to 
other entities. The corporate performance of such firms increases parallelly to a rising control 
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of the entity (in terms of voting rights). Previous studies have shown that founding family firms 
taken public by the original founders outperform other owners. If the corporate performance 
remains adequate, the founder will maintain the owner share of the company. Hence, these 
results imply that firms where the original founder persists substantial control create superior 
value, have efficient strategies and are more profitable which in turn indicates that such firms 
might be a favorable investment opportunity for outside stakeholders.  
 
5.2 Delimitations 
Although this thesis contributes to current literature in several aspects as previously 
mentioned, there may also be certain limitations in need of reflection. First, a potential risk of 
biased results is always present due to subjective interpretations of the results. However, such 
drawbacks were continuously recognized and considered during the data collection process as 
well as in the construction of variables. Despite the efforts, I acknowledge the ambiguity of 
biases and the problem may not be entirely mitigated.  
Second, an inherent delimitation of this research relates to generalizability of the results. 
The study is performed on a unique sample of publicly listed firms in the Swedish institutional 
setting which is considered as a transparent country regarding financial disclosures. Although 
the findings are statistically significant, it is questionable whether the results are applicable to 
other foreign settings with a less efficient market that may be prohibited by e.g. stricter local 
law, regulations and limitations in the availability of accounting information.  
Lastly, the study encounters a methodological problem when testing the extent of 
internationalization. More precisely, the measure of international activity uses both the 
proportion of foreign sales (FORSALES), foreign employees (FOREMPL) and presence in 
geographical regions (FORDIV) as dependent variable. Findings from several univariate and 
multivariate regressions with different test and control variables have been presented; and 
somewhat understandably, statistically significant results cannot be found for all variables in 
all models. The results from the regressions generally show statistical significance for 
FORSALES and FORDIV, but not for FOREMPL. As such, does this mean that we confirm or 
refute the research hypotheses? The measure FOREMPL was included for robustness reasons 
as described in chapter three. In line with both former research and the approach of this paper, 
FORSALE has been used as the main approach. Due to statistically significant results from these 
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regressions together with the results from the alternative measure of international activities 
(FORDIV), the first research hypotheses (both 1a and 1b) are confirmed.       
 
5.3 Suggestions for future research 
This paper is a contribution to a growing body of founding family governance literature. 
Few studies within this category are performed on publicly listed firms in Sweden. Since this 
research is limited to a specific context, it would be very interesting to examine similar research 
hypotheses in other geographical regions. However, it may be difficult to obtain a large and 
unique unbalanced data set in other countries due to transparency of financial disclosures and 
requirements set by local law. As an example, Norway has few listed entities which would make 
the analyses less comprehensive and the corresponding results presumably less significant. An 
alternative approach could be to investigate private companies. Nevertheless, these firms do not 
have the same requirements on financial disclosures and annual reports compared to listed 
entities which may provide challenges in the data collection process. Regardless of the 
geographical context of future studies, the data set should be fairly large and include an 
extensive time period in order to obtain statistically significant results.  
 Another interesting area of research would be to further extend the work performed by 
(Qian, Li, Li, & Qian, 2008) and explain the global diversification strategies of founder-
controlled firms. Specifically, one could for instance compare and quantify companies in three 
dimensions of internationalization; sales, employees and diversification. It would be fascinating 
to identify different type of firms and investigate whether there is a significant distinction 
between global, export, and import firms, their inherent corporate governance structure and the 
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Appendix I  
 














Year Listed Foreign Industry No home Only foreign Only Swedish No revenue Missing EU home Nordic home Final
2001 290 13 50 8 1 18 11 18 14 10 147
2002 288 13 48 8 1 14 11 11 13 13 156
2003 273 14 45 7 1 12 12 8 13 16 145
2004 270 17 42 6 1 13 11 6 13 19 142
2005 266 16 43 6 1 13 8 7 12 19 141
2006 268 15 46 8 2 11 6 6 15 21 138
2007 267 17 47 6 2 10 6 6 13 21 139
2008 256 15 46 3 2 9 9 3 14 14 141
2009 251 15 42 3 2 11 8 3 10 4 153
2010 243 16 39 3 2 11 8 2 6 3 153
2011 247 18 38 3 2 10 9 2 2 3 160
2012 248 20 37 3 3 9 9 1 3 2 161
2013 251 19 42 4 4 7 9 1 3 2 160
2014 262 23 45 4 3 9 7 2 3 2 164
2015 279 23 50 4 2 11 7 1 3 2 176
2016 296 22 55 5 2 16 7 1 3 2 183
2017 314 22 54 7 2 15 7 2 7 2 196
2018 328 23 57 8 2 14 15 4 6 2 197
2019 331 23 59 6 2 16 18 4 6 1 196





Table 3: Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
